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ABSTRACT 
As the Cold War drew to a close during the late 1980s, United Nations' 
peacekeeping dramatically expanded with respect to both the number of missions and the 
duties it performed. Post Cold-War era peacekeeping is controversial. AdvO'.;ates and 
critics of this new generdtion of peacekeeping disagree as to whether the consequences 
of individual missions are positive or negative. This thesis addresses the above debate. 
The present study analyzes the origins, political support, mandate, financing, and 
the planning and implementation of the UN peacekeeping ope""ation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. By focusing on these factors, this case study attempts to determine the 
effectiveness and feasibility of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The thesis focuses upon the development of the UNPROFOR 
mission from its beginning until December 31, 1994. The author's conclusion is that 
despite the obstacles and dilemmas facing the UN mission, the peacekeepers can be 
viewed as making a positive difference in the conflict. The author also concludes that 
peacekeepers are only part of the solution to the Bosnian conflict and that a settlement 
lies outside the sphere of UNPROFOR's mandate. Before undertaking the UNPROFOR 
case study, both the history and the development of peacekeeping are reviewed to provide 
a better understanding of what peacekeeping is and how it has changed since the end of 
the Cold War. The part of the thesis title which appears within quotation marks is taken 
from a presentation made by retired Canadian Armed Forces Major-General Lewis 
MacKenzie on the CBC television program, Witness. 
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PREFACE 
My interest in pt"..acekeeping was prompted in late 1993 by an incident involving 
several Canadian members of the United Nations Protection Fore.! (UNPROFOR) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In December 1993, eleven members of the Armed Forces serving 
with the UN mission in Bosnia were captured, detained, and subjected to a mock 
execution by Bosnian Serb forces. Fortunately, the peacekeepers were released 
unharmed, but the incident sparked off a debate within Canada on the role of Canadian 
peacekeepers in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. With the capture 
of the troops, I began to question the value of Canada's presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
My interest later grew to include the larger question of the viability of the whole UN 
operation in Bosnia-Ht;tzegovina. 
Now, more than at any point in history, we are living in a world where change 
is an ever incr~.asing part of our lives. Indeed, some would argue the world has changed 
more in the last five years than it has in the last fifty. Even after the momentous events 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the politiccllandscape of the world continues to shift 
and change as the international community ai:tempts to adjust to tile realities of the post-
Cold Wax era. Peacekeeping, too, has experienced change as it has gone through a 
period of rapid modification and development since the end of the Cold War. It appears 
that the evolution of peacekeeping has not yel reached an endpoint as the United Nations 
continues to take on new roles and responsibilities. Indeed, UN peacekeeping is a 
steadily evolving technique and any venture that attempts to explain or assess it can prove 
X 
to be a very demanding task. In the words of Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General for 
Peace-keeping Operations, attempting "to cast some light on United Nations peace-
keeping in transition ... is much like trying to paint a moving train." 1 I have humbly 
undertaken that very task, and ask the reader's indulgence in assessing the conclusions 
and contribution of my work. 
1 United Nations, United Nations Peace-keeping (New York, 1993), Foreword. 
xi 
CHAPTER t - INTRODUCTION 
The Cold War is over, the Berlin Wall has fallen, and the Soviet Union has 
disintegrated. It is time for the emergence of a new world order. These thoughts 
probably echoed in the minds of many people during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Indeed, there was a new world just around the comer but it was one that would be 
marked by a larger degree of turmoil and chaos than peace and harmony. The new 
international community that has developed since the end of the Cold War may be more 
appropriately referred tfl as ihc: n ... w world disorder, a world which has witnessed an 
increase in civil wars and internal conflicts, the re-emergence of ethnic and religious 
struggles, and the collapse of states into anarchy. Only now, by looking back with the 
benefit of hindsight, is it possible to see the effect of the end of the Cold War on the 
international system. While the threat of a major confrontation between East and West 
and the threat of a nuclear war have diminished, the threat of war itself has not, as civil 
wars and ethnic conflicts rage on in Bosnia-Herzego~ina, Somalia, Rwanda, and other 
comers of the globe. 
International peacekeeping missions have proliferated in response to these 
conflicts. Peacekeeping is never an easy task but Cold War era peacekeepers seemed to 
have had an easier job than post-Cold War era peacekeepers. Cold War or "first 
generation" peacekeeping, with the exception of the operations in the Congo and Cyprus, 
was fairly straightforward as each mission usually had the full consent and cooperation 
of the warring parties and was deplcyed after a cease-fire was reached. Typically, Cold 
·war peacekeeping dealt with inter-state disputes which involved legitimate and 
recognized governments. Cease-fires, consent, and cooperation usually made the 
mandates of traditional peacekeeping missions clear and appropriate as they were 
delegated the tasks of monitoring and patrolling buffer zones, cease-fires, and troop 
withdrawals. However, "second-generation" peacekeepers have not had it as easy as 
their predecl!ssors and mandates now include potentially dangerous and comp!ex tasks 
such as monitoring human rights, rebuilding the political and economic institutions of 
states, and delivering and protecting humanitarian assistance, sometimes by the use of 
force. Frequently, the new duties of post-Cold war peacekeepers have been carried out 
in the middle of armed conflicts in which consent and cooperation have been very shaky 
and limited. The recent and on-going operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and 
Somalia are good examples of the difficulties peacekeepers face in the post-Cold War era 
as personnel in these operations have been harassed, shot at, held against their will, and 
killed. 
The role of these peacekeeping expeditions is controversial. The local 
consequences of individual operations are debated intensely and the general question has 
been posed as to whether peacekeeping will be undermined or strengthened as a result 
of recent experiences. It seems appropriate to ask whether the UN's recent peacekeeping 
ventures are part of the solution to the individual conflicts or whether they instead 
become a part of the problem themselves? In order to determine some possible answers 
to these questions, it is important that particular conflicts and UN operations be examined 
closely. 
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William Durch and his colleagues provide a model for the study of peacekeeping 
operations in their important study, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping. Following this 
example, the present study will analyze the origins, political support, mandate, financing, 
and the planning and implementation of the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. By focusing on these factors, this case study will attempt to determine the 
effectiveness and feasibility of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It will also examine the contributions, if any, that UNPROFOR has 
made to the evolution of UN peacekeeping. 
Work on this thesis was completed at a time when UNPROFOR's future appeared 
doubtful. The supposed "safe-area" surrounding the Bosnian locality, Bihac was under 
fierce assault by Bosnian Serbs and UN peacekeepers had fallen hostage to these forces. 
A future thesis on UNPROFOR very well might bear the subtitle "A Case Study in 
Failure." It would be premature now, however, to make a definitive judgement on 
UNPROFOR and the best one can do is to draw provisional conclusions on the central 
issues this thesis addresses. The formal end-point for this study is December 31, 1994. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
Peacekeeping during the Cold War (1948-1988) 
Peacekeeping•, or even the idea behind it, is not mentio11ed anywhere in the 
Charter of the United Nations. It goes "beyond purely diplomatic means for peaceful 
settlement of disputes described in Chapter VI. but falls short of the military or other 
enforcement provisions of Chapter VII. "2 Former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold 
best described the place for peacekeeping when he said that it might be put in a new 
Chapter Six and Half.3 Peacekeeping emerged to respond to the failure of the United 
Nations collective security system, a system which proved to be unworkable as a result 
of the Cold War. The thirteen peacekeeping operations that were set up during the Cold 
War consisted of lightly armed military personnel from small and middle sized countries 
such as Canada, Norway, and Finland.4 Major powers such as the United States and 
the Soviet Union typically did not provide troops to peacekeeping operations because they 
were usually directly or indirectly involved in Cold War era conflicts. 
During the Cold War, there were two types of peacekeeping: observer missions 
and peacekeeping forces. Observer missions consisted of unarmed personnel who were 
assigned the tasks of monitoring, observing, and reporting on events. Peacekeeping 
forces, on the other hand, consisted of lightly armed military personnel who were 
assigned the tasks of patrolling and monitoring buffer zones and cease-fires with the aim 
ot· keeping the warring factions apart. 5 Peacekeeping was not created to solve a conflict 
or dispute, rather, its purpose was to try and maintain the peace and calm on the front 
lines in order to buy time for the peacemakers to negotiate a peaceful settlement between 
the combatants. 
While there was no universally accepted definition of traditional peacekeeping, 
there evolved a broad degree of consensus on some of its basic characteristics. These 
include: 
non-use of force- in traditional operations the use of force was prohibited except in self 
defense, "including resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent [a peacekeeping 
force] from discharging its duties. "6 
consent - the host country or countries had to consent to the deployment of a UN 
peacekeeping operation on their land. If a country refused, then the United Nations 
could not force a peacekeeping operation upon that state. The importance of consent was 
demonstrated in the late 1960s with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) 
which was deployed in Egypt in 1956 to separate Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai. 
In May 1967, an Egyptian request was made for the withdrawal of UNEF troops from 
their positions. U Thant, Secretary-General at the time, complied with the Egyptian 
request in concurrence with the terms of the "good faith" agreement signed between Dag 
Hammarskjold, Thant's predecessor, and Egyptian President Nasser.7 
cooperation- "The parties concerned are called upon not only to consent to the initiation 
and deployment of a peacekeeping operation, but also they are supposed to cooperate for 
the smooth functif'ning of the operation. nS Therefore, the principle of cooperation was 
seen as an extension of the principle of consent. 
non-intervention/impartiality - it had to be made clear that the peacekeeping operation 
did not favour one side over another or interfere in the internal affairs of a country. 
When non-intervention and impartiality were lacking this created many problems. The 
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) h1 the early 1960s, while eventually 
successful in achieving its mandate, demonstrated the difficulties that peacekeepers faced 
when these principles were violated.~ 
broad political supporl - all peacekeeping operations had to have the broad politicai 
support of the international community, especially the members of the Security Council. 
Although the General Assembly can authorize peacekeeping missions the responsibility 
has tended to be a power of the Security Council. Legally speaking the General 
Assembly, under the "Uniting For Peace" resolution, can authorize a peacekeeping 
mission but it has only used this power once (UNEF I) and it is unlikely that it will use 
it again without the approval of the Security Council. 10 Therefore, the support of the 
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Big Five (U.S., U.K, the Soviet Union11 , France, China) was and still is important. 
No operation, even post-Cold War operations, has succeeded without the support of the 
permanent members of the Security Council. 
clear and appropriale mandate - the purpose and function of the operation had to be 
made clear to the countries and/or parties involved, to the Security Council, and to the 
peacekeepers themselves. Whether the operation had only one function or a combination 
of two or three functions, "the drafting of the mandate should be skilful enough to avoid 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations on objectives, strategies, methods, and 
tactics. "12 
The Second-Generation of Peacekeeping (1988-1994) 
While second-generation peacekeeping missions still perform the traditional duties 
of monitoring and patrolling buffer zones, cease-fires, and troop withdrawals, they have 
also taken on new roles which have included supervising and organising elections, 
rebuilding states, and delivering and protecting humanitarian assistance by force if 
necessary. 13 This new era of peacekeeping has emerged to respond to the vastly 
different political landscape which has been created by several post-Cold War global 
trends. These trends include the diffusion of power, the crisis of the nation-state, there-
emergence of ethnicity and religion, and the expanding scope of security.14 
Diffuoon of power 
During the Cold War international affairs were dominated by the two 
superpowers, the United States and the former Soviet Union, as the "bipolar world of the 
Cold War saw power put to use in an intense contest of wills ... when every international 
event was either influenced by their rivalry or filtered through its lens. "15 The end of 
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the Cold War has marked the end of the bipolar world and the emergence of a much 
more complicated world in which there is a greater diffusion of power. The United 
States now is generally regarded as the world's only superpower as a result of its 
powerful military capabilities and its economic strength. But increased social, economic 
and political problems at home have caused the United States to begin to reconsider its 
global interests.16 Hence, the development of a multipolar system appears likely. 
The crisis of the nation-state 
Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner sum up this trend: 
From Haiti in the Western Hemisphere to the remnantll of Yugoslavia, from Somalia, Sudan 
and Liberia in Africa to Cambodia in Southeast Asia, a disturbing new phenomenon is 
emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the 
international community .17 
Indeed, this trend may be the most significant challenge confronting the international 
community. During the post-World War II era, a number of states, such as Yugoslavia 
and Somalia, benefitted from superpower support but with the end of the Cold War and 
the demise of the USSR, this support drastically dwindled. The question that remains 
is whether states such as Somalia and Rwanda, and other newly formed states, such as 
the former republics of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, are capable of sustaining 
themselves as members of the international community. The results of failed states could 
11be debilitating both for the citizens of those states and for the international community, 
faced with the tasks of providir.6 peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and of coping 
with refugees. "11 The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the civil wars in Somalia and 
Rwanda have proved this point well. 
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The re-emergence of ethnicity and religion 
Ethnic groups are people who share the same culture in terms of language, 
traditions, and customs. 19 Conflict between such groups is an important recent (but not 
a novel) trend. The Cold War superpowers discouraged ethnic conflict in Europe. The 
current rise of ethnic conflicts there specifically relates to the collapse of communism and 
the ideological triumph of democracy. Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal contend that the 
collapse of communism was in fact a collapse of legitimacy itself. 20 They assert that 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, which dominated most of the Eastern European 
states during the Cold War, had the ability of dampening ethnic issues and if ethnic 
problems did occur they could simply be suppressed. But Cooper and Berdal contend 
that a democratic system of government "requires the identification of a political 
community to which everyone belongs; voluntary acceptance of majority decisions 
implies a strong sense of common destiny. "21 They claim that if people are permitted 
to select who governs them, then many believe that they should also determine who is 
to be governed. Therefore: 
it is not an accident that the sudden overthrow of authoritarian regimes and the arrival of 
democracy have been accompanied by ethnic tensions and secessionist movements. This is 
true in Africa - where the end of the Cold War also removed the legitimacy ascribed to one-
p1U1y rule -as it is in Europe.zz 
The expanding scope of security 
In the new world order, the scope and meaning of security has broadened beyond 
the traditional military-based definition. In the post-Cold War era, nuclear and military 
issues still figure prominently in discussions of internationru security but economic, 
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environmental, and human rights issues are now considered by the United Nations to be 
important to global security. One such issue that is specifically relevant to this study 
concerns provision of humanitarian aid to areas affected by internal strife. Conflicts such 
as those in Bosnic,, Somalia, and Rwanda have brought this issue to the fore. The Report 
of the Canadian Parliament's Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs points out 
that what has changed is the way in which the world perceives such conflicts or threats 
of conflict: 
The communication revolution-the phenomenon of the 'global village'-has magnified the 
impact of strife everywhere. Consequently, in the discussion of emerging security i!ISUe~> that 
aollows the most salient factor may well be the increasing visibility of all these i1111uel! as 
much as the issues themselves. ;u 
When the violence and carnage that accompanies these conflicts appear on televisions 
across the world, a state's citizens might put pressure on its government to "do 
something. u The "CNN factor"24 has applied an added amount of pressure on the 
international community to respond to the sufferings of populations who are the 
unfortunate victims of these violent and inhumane conflicts. 
The Effect of These Trends on Peacekeeping 
What have these trends meant to peacekeeping? These trends have created a 
different or "second-generation" of peacekeeping in which the main characteristics can 
be described as follows: 
-new operations have taken on expanded roles and duties, 
-they frequently include a larger civilian and police component, 
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-they arc often involved in the organization and guidance of elections, 
-they usually contain a human rights dimension, and 
-they arc increasingly concerned with internal conflicts which sometimes involves 
intervention into the domestic affairs of states.25 
Even though the duties in some of the new operations may differ from the classic 
operations, they still retain some of the basic characteristics of traditional peacekeeping 
missions; their mandates are not to end the conflict by military means; the operations still 
are supposed to be impartial; and, the broad support of the international community and 
most especially of the permanent members of the Security Council is important to the 
organization of these operations. 26 However, there are some important differences 
between the two "generations" of peacekeeping missions.27 
Different mandates and environment 
Peacekeepmg mandates are changing: in some instances the primary mandate is 
no longer to prevent or contain a conflict but rather to protect citizens from the effects 
of the conflict. For example, the mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina is to 
provide humanitarian aid and protection whilst a violent struggle continues. 
Whereas traditional operations were usually deployed during a cease-fire, second-
generation operations are increasingly being carried out in the middle of a conflict. 
Also, the rules of engagement for post-Cold War operations are changing. With respect 
to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and UNPROFOR the Security Council 
authorized the use of "all necessary means," including the use of force, to achieve their 
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mandates. 
LimiJed consent/cooperation 
Second-generation operations do not necessarily have the consent of all parties 
involved. In civil wars or internal conflicts, not all of the warring factions may agree 
to the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation. For example, in an internal conflict, 
only one of the warring factions may agree to a United Nations' presence. The one 
warring faction that does not consent to the presence of the peacekeeping mission could 
seriously hamper the peacekeepers from achieving their intended mandate. Also, the 
warring factions in an internal conflict could consent to the establishment of a 
peacekeeping force but change their minds or refuse to cooperate with the peacekeepers 
after the deployment of the mission. This happened with the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) a:; the Khmer Rouge faction initially agreed to a UN 
presence but later, after the deployment of the mission, refused to coopt:rate with the 
peacekeeping operation. 28 
Consent of all parties involved may be also hard to achieve with respect to 
preventive deployment, a type of peacekeeping discussed by UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda For Peace. With respect to preventive depioyment 
on one side of a border, there is always the possibility that the other party may object 
to its proximity. 29 To date, UNPROFOR in Macedonia, has been the only preventive 
peacekeeping operation. 
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Lack of a legitimaJe government 
Second-generation operations are increasingly confronted by states with no 
legitimate government or a government that is too weak to assist in the deployment of 
~ 'JN operation. This was the case with UNOSOM. In instances where there are weak 
governments, cooperation is sought but it must be on an ad hoc basis because weak 
governments may be overthrown or ousted by one or more of the regional war-lords 
fighting for power. A weak government may consent to the deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation. But, by the time the operdtion is deployed, a new government 
could be in power and it is possible that it might refuse to com;ent to the deployment of 
the peacekeepers. 
Lack of a blueprint 
Second-generation operations lack an operational blueprint as there are no set 
rules or guidance for this new era of peacekeeping. Thus, these operations cannot be 
generalized. Second-generation operations are confronted with different and very 
complex problems and what worked in one operation will not necessarily work in 
another. For this reason, post-Cold War peacekeeping must be approached on a case by 
case basis. Even Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has stated that the complex nature of 
today's conflicts requires "the United Nations to discern between conflicts and to tailor 
each operation to the particuhr circumstances of each situation. "30 Lack of an 
operational blueprint was also a problem for first-generation operations, but it seems to 
be a greater problem for second-generation operations as post-Cold War peacekeepers 
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have been confronted with increasingly difficult conflicts involving a greater degree of 
uncertainty, resulting in larger missions with a greater civilian and police component. 
As mentioned previously, observer missions and peacekeeping forces were the 
only types of traditional operations that were present during the Cold War. These types 
of operations are still present today but the end of the Cold War has added a variety of 
other types of peacekeeping missions. These post-Cold War operations can be arranged 
into a continuum: 
at one end are the lowest intensity operations, involving the smallest number of Willett~ 1md 
the least risk of conflict to UN contingents: at lhe oppo•ing end conflict level ill high 1md 
involves larger military assets.31 
Beginning at the lowest end, the continuum includes traditional peacekeeping, preventive 
deployment, assistance in the maintenance of law and order, humanitarian peacekeeping, 
rescuing "failed states" and cease-fire enforcement.32 
Traditional Peacekeeping 
Traditional peacekeeping operations, which already have heen described, were 
assigned tasks such as monitoring and patrolling cease-fires and buffer zones. Some 
traditional operations that have been set up after the Cold War include the United Nations 
Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the United Nations Good Offices Mission 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the United Nations Iran-Iract Military 
Observer Group (UNIIMOG), and the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 
(UNOMUR).33 
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Preventive Deployment 
This type of peacekeeping has been advocated in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's An 
Agenda For Peace and it simply involves, at the request of a state, the deployment of 
peacekeepers into a country before a conflict has begun. The main task of this type of 
force is to prevent the spread of a conflict into a country or to ward off a potential 
aggressor. Preventive deployment, which has also been referred to as tripwire 
peacekeeping, is being applied for the first time by UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Its purpose is to prevent the fighting in Bosnia from 
spreading into Macedonia. To date, the operation has been a success. 34 
Assistance in the Maintenance of Law and Order 
The purpose of this type of operation is for the peacekeepers to assist parties 
involved in a dispute to implement a settlement that has already been agreed upon. With 
this type of operation, UN peacekeepers have been requested to perform a number of 
traditional and second-generational tasks such as monitoring cease-fires and troop 
withdrawals, supervising and conducting elections, supervising a cease-fire between 
irregular forces, supervising present administrations, confirming respect for human 
rights, and disarming warring factions. Examples of these operations include the United 
Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), the United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission I,II (UNAVEM), the United Nations Observer Group in Central 
America (ONUCA), the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNT AG), and the 
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (tAINURSO). It is this 
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type of peacekeeping which has seen the most rapid growth since the end of the Cold 
War.3s 
HumaniJarian Peacekeeping 
In this type of operation, the peacekeepers, during civil wars and natural disasters, 
either supervise or protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance or deliver it 
themselves. Examples of humanitarian operations include the UN Operations in Somalia 
(UNOSOM 1,11) and UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Peacekeeping missions which 
contain a humanitarian dimension have sometimes been authorized to use "all necessary 
means," including the use of force, against parties which interfere or impede the 
peacekeepers from achieving their mandate. 36 
"Rescuing" Failed States 
According to Marrack Goulding, former Under-Secretary-General for Peace-
keeping Operations and now Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, this type of 
operation involves the deployment of 
a United Nations force in a country where the institutions of state have largely collapsed, 
arorcby and lawlessneS& abound, lhe breakup of the country may be imminent and some 
external agency is needed to put it together again.n 
Rescuing failed states has been described metaphorically as "painting a nation blue. "38 
Painting countries blue is how Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary, described the 
likelihood that the UN would soon be required to take over the administration of failed 
states once peace and order were restored. 39 The operation in Somalia was an example 
of this type of operation. Although it has been argued that this type of operation is not 
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peacekeeping, in many ways it still retains some of the basic characteristics of classic 
peacekeeping: the operation is supposed to remain impartial and any action that unfairly 
benefits one side over the other is supposed to be avoided; it can still receive broad 
political support; and, the parties in the conflict can give their cooperation to the UN 
force and provide their consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in their 
territory. Since there is no legitimate government in these types of operations, the UN 
forces might have difficulty in obtaining consent from all of the involvoo parties. Even 
if all factions initially agree to the presence of UN forces, one of the parties may later 
change its position and this could cause problems for the peacekeeping operation. 
The "painting a nation blue" operation, more than any other, involves the 
intervention of the United Nations into the internal affairs of a country. In the post-Cold 
War era, the UN has become more frequently involved in the internal affairs of states 
such as Cambodia, Iraq, Angola, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Nicaragua, and Mozambique.40 
In the case of Somalia and Iraq, the UN was not invited into these countries but rather 
intervened on its own to protect human rights and deliver humanitarian assistance. In 
the new world era, there has been a heightened debate about whether the UN has the 
right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states. Some have claimed that Article 2(7) 
of the United Nations Charter restricts the UN from getting involved in matters that are 
considered to be of a domestic nature, but the same Charror article also declares that it 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
Therefore, when an intra-state conflict threatens global peace, the UN can justify its 
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involv~ ment into the domestic affairs of a state, with the purpose of maintaining 
international peace and security, by utilizing the last clause of Article 2(7).'n 
Cease-fire Enforcement 
This type of operation has been referred to as a ,.forceful variant" of traditional 
peacekeeping as it is the same as traditional peacekeeping in the following ways: all 
parties would initially agree to the deployment of the operation; it would be impartial as 
it would not carry out any actions which would favour one party over another; and, it 
would have the political support of the Security Council. However, it differs from 
traditional peacekeeping since the operation could not only use force in self defence but 
also against a party that consistently violates a cease-fire agreement. With this type of 
operation the United Nations runs the risk of becoming part of the conflict as its actions 
might appear to favour one party over the other. 
Cease-fire or peace-enforcement operations also differ from traditional operations 
in terms of the types of armed forces needed. Peace-enforcement operations are usually 
built around one state (the U.S. led operations in Iraq-Kuwait and Somalia during 1991 
and 1993, respectively) and contain a large number of troops who are heavily armed with 
a full range of offensive and defensive weapons. Traditional operations, on the other 
hand, are built around several small and middle sized countries and c.;ontain a smaller 
number of troops who are lightly armed with defensive weapons. 42 John Ruggie 
highlights an important distinction when he points out that traditional missions, unlike 
cease-fire and peace-enforcement operations, "are not designed to create the conditions 
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for their own success on the ground; those conditions must pre-exist for them to be able 
to perform their role. "43 The objectives of each type of operation also differ. As 
Charles Dobbie indicates, "[t]he peacekeeper to peace-enforcer is as referee to football 
player .... One is there to win, the other to ensure fair play. One is a supervisor, the 
other a combatant. "44 
The following figure attempts to provide a summary representation of the 
preceding discussion. 
Figure 1 - Characteristics of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping Operations 
Types of Peacekeeping 
Characteristics 
Use of force 
Consent 
Cooperation 
Impartiality 
Non-intervention 
Political Support 
Trad -Traditional Peacekeeping 
Prev- Preventive Deployment 
Trad 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Hum - Humanitarian Peacekeeping 
Ye. -usually present 
• - conditionally present 
No - usually not present 
Prev 
No 
... 
Yes 
... 
Yes 
Yes 
Assistance Hum Failed 
in law and states 
order 
No Yes Yes 
Yes ... ... 
... ... ... 
... ... ... 
... No No 
Yes Yes Yes 
Cease-fire 
enforcement 
Yes 
... 
... 
No 
No 
Yes 
During the Cold War the UN security system was immobile because of the 
superpo .. '"'! conflict, so peacekeeping emerged as an alternative solution or extension to 
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the collective security system of the United Nations. Traditional peacekeeping served 
its purpose, but after the Cold War, it was not sufficient in itself to respond to all of the 
complex problems confronting the world. Therefore, second-generation peacekeeping 
emerged as an extension of traditional peacekeeping to deal with the new political climate 
of the post-Cold War era. The development of these new operations is directly 
attributable to cooperation between the major powers of the Security Council, especially 
between the United States and Russia. During the Cold War the types of peacekeeping 
operations just discussed were impossible because their establishment would be blocked 
by one of the veto-powers in the Security Council. In the post-Cold War era, the 
Security Council is now willing to go into areas were it would not have gone during the 
Cold War. There is no doubt that the operations in Angola, Somalia, Cambodia, and 
Bosnia would never have been undertaken in the Cold War era. The Security Council 
is not only more willing to go into new areas, but it is also willing to undertake Chapter 
VJ! military operations, something that was done only once. during the Cold War. 
Hence, the cooperation between the Security Council has resulted in some new types of 
peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era; some parallel to Cold War operations, others 
diverge at much more drastic rate from the traditional definition, while others belong in 
the middle. 
Indeed, peacekeeping has evolved into a very different concept than what was 
intended by Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarskjold when they set up the first 
peacekeeping operation in the Middle East during the mid 1950s. It appears as the world 
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moves towards the twenty first century, the idea or concept behind UN peacekeeping 
could possibly move even farther away from its original definition as there has been talk 
of using peacekeepers to battle the drug trade, patrol the world's waterways, combat 
terrorism, respond to environmental disasters, and verify arms control. Even the chief 
of the United Nations, Boutros Boutrc:;-Ghali, has discussed the possibility of a ••third-
generation" of peacekeeping.4s 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE UNITED NATIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
Background 
The conflict in Bosnia is one that cannot be fully understood without looking at 
the whole Yugoslav conflict because the former is an extension of the latter. The 
discussion to follow, which provides background information, will concentrate on recent 
developments, but it is recognized that a full explanation of Yugoslavia's break-up would 
require extensive historical analysis. Similar to the process of peeling an onion, one 
must uncover layer after layer of historical developments to reach the end result of a 
definitive explanation. There is not sufficient scope here to present such an analysis. 
Yugoslavia's46 disintegration, and subsequent civil war, was precipitated most 
immediately by declarations of independence made by political Jeaderships in two of its 
constituent republics, Slovenia and Croatia, during June 1991.47 A prior gradual 
disintegration of Yugoslavia's principal integrative force, its Communist Party, had taken 
place during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.48 Nationalist Communist Party 
leaders, committed to incompatible political goals, had come to power in Yugoslavia's 
different constituent republics during the 1980's. The most important of these leaders 
was Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. Scholars have focused considerau~e attention on his 
role in disrupting Yugoslavia's fragile unity.49 Yugoslavia's dissolution, however, as 
Steven L. Bu.~ indicates, cannot be attributed to just one factor:50 
Internal political conflicts in the 1980s, and the effort by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic 
to mobilize Serb nationalism on behalf of a strengthened federation, de1troyed tho cohe1ion 
of the country's regional Communist leadership• and woakenod their control over society. 
Deteriorating oconomic condition~ - especially plummeting livin& standards - eroded lhe 
benefits of sultaining the Yug01lav stale and stimulated the rise of ma&~ nationalism• and 
interethnic hostilities. The conflicting natiooalilt upirations of tho Yug01lav people• and 
their leaders' efforts to maximize power, led to conflict over the control of disputed 
territories. ~1 
Serbia's push for a tighter centralized government not only stemmed from its 
desire to maintain its dominant role but also as a way to regain some of the power which 
was lost under the reign of Josip Broz "Tito. ".s2 When Tito created the "second 
Yugoslavia" he did not try to divide the state along ethnic lines, and, in fact, it appeared 
that he sought to weaken the power of the Serbs by internally dividing them. According 
to James Steinberg: 
The internal borders (which remained until the country's breakup in 1991) did not attempt 
tu consolidate populations along ethnic lines; indeed it appeared that Tito ... intentionally 
sought to limit the Serbs' clout by the way he drew the administrative divisions. Thus the 
borders of Serbia did not embrace all the areas with large Serb populations; both Bosnia and 
Croatia contain large Serb enclaves. $3 
With Tito's plan, Serbia was the biggest loser; prewar "Southern Serbia" was 
turned into the republic of Macedonia, the former Serb kingdom of Montenegro was 
made a nation in its own right, while within Serbia itself two autonomous provinces, 
Kosovo and Vojvodina, were created.54 Tito's division of Serbia did not sit well with 
Serbs as they saw it as a deliberate conspiracy to weaken their power. Despite the 
Serbian grievances, the internal divisions remained. 
After Tito's death in 1980, a new governmental structure, designed to cater to the 
interests of the various ethnic groups by rotating the Yugoslav presidency among the six 
republics, was implemented. 55 It was hoped that the post-Tito govemmem structure 
would be sufficient to counterbalance the different ethnic and religious interests of the 
Yugoslav citizens but it proved to be unsuccessful. As Steinberg has pointed out: 
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The prosperous Catholic republics of Slovenia and Croatia resented shttring their economic 
good fortune with their poorer Muslim and Orthodox compatriot~~, while Serh11, embittered 
by the fetters imposed by Tito, chaf~ under the new structure, which, in their view, denied 
them their due.56 
During the early and mid 1980s, nationalist movements began to achieve momentum in 
Yugoslavia, as many regional leaders viewed nationalism as a way of keeping themselves 
in power. In 1985, a group of academics formulated a memorandum through the Serbian 
Academy of Arts and Sciences calling for a "Serbian nationalist awakening." The 
memorandum, which was leaked to the press in 1986, set out a plan which called for the 
dismantling ofTito's Yugoslavia and a return to the Serbian hegemony that was enjoyed 
during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.S7 Dobrica Cosic, who would later become 
President of rump Yugoslavia,5s was a prominent force behind the memorandum while 
Slobodan Milosevic, leader of Serbia since his election in 1987, was in agreement with 
its ideas. 59 
With the call for a "Serbian nationalist awakening" and the growing animosity 
towards communism in Yugosl;~via and Eastern Europe, independence movements in 
Slovenia and Croatia began to gain popularity in the late 1980s. In 1990, when the 
Yugoslav Communist Party faltered, the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia began to call for 
a loose confederation of sovereign republics but Serbian leaders, who advocated a 
stronger centralized federation, resisted this move. 60 In June 1990, Serbian President 
Slobodan Milosevic warned that any attempts to transform Yugoslavia into a confederal 
state would make its internal borders an open political question.61 In issuing his 
warning, Milosevic asserted that Serbia "links its present administrative borders 
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exclusively to a Yugoslavia constituted as a federation .... If one does not want a federal 
state, the question of Serbian borders is an open political question. ''62 As Milosevic 
continued to push for a stronger centralized Yugoslavia, the calls among Croats, 
Slovenes, and Bosnians for a looser confederation or for complete independence from the 
Yugoslav center intensified. 63 The conflict over the political make up of Yugoslavia 
was at a standstill and this standoff accelerated the drive for independence in Slovenia 
in December 1990 and Croatia in May 1991. Each of these culminated in votes for 
secession. 64 
The Yugoslav federation was on the brink of disaster and it appeared that its 
disintegration was an inevitable outcome. Indeed, in this case, appearances were not 
deceiving and the final blow to the Yugoslav federation came as a result of a 
constitutional predicament. Under the rotating presidency implemented after Tito's 
death, a Croatian, by the name of Stipe Mdiic, wa.; scheduled tc ~me the Yugoslav 
president on May 15, 1991 but his appointment was blocked by Serbia. Any hope of 
keeping Yugoslavia together was shattered by this move and the federation was no longer 
functional. 6.5 
When Yugoslavia began to unravel, the United States and the European 
Community (EC), now the European Union (EU)66, made it clear that they were not 
keen on any plan that called for the dismemberment of the Yugoslav state.67 However, 
the Germans, who believed that Yugoslavia could only be kept together with force, began 
pushing for early international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.61 Western 
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governments, and many other members of the international community, ardently 
supported Yugoslavia's territorial integrity for two reasons. First, many states favoured 
this position because they feared that an ethnic battle would erupt if Yugoslavia began 
to breakup, and, secondly, many felt that its demise would set a dangerous precedent for 
other states, especially the USSR.69 In May 1991, State Department Spokesman, 
Margaret Tutwiler, stated that "the United States will not encourage or reward 
secession .... We firmly believe that Yugoslavia's external or internal borders should not 
be changed unless by peaceful consensual means. "70 This position, in fact, echoed the 
feelings of many Western governments on Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. The stance 
of the Western powers was interpreted by Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, and 
other Serbian hardliners, as a "green light" or :-.upport for their ideas of a stronger 
centralized Yugoslavia. 71 
Despite the stance of the U.S. and the We:aern European governments, and the 
threats from Milosevic, Slovenia and Croatia opted for secession and formally declared 
their independence from the Yugoslav federation on June 25, 1991. The Serbian 
dominated federal government was opposed to Croatia and Slovenia's independence and 
it instructed the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to intervene to prevent the republics 
from seceding. n The outcome was a bloody and violent conflict that would eventually 
engulf another republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The war in Slovenia was short, and, after 
ten days of fighting, a cease-fire (Brioni Accords) was arranged by the European 
Community. By July 19, 1991, the JNA had withdrawn its forces from Slovenia in 
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defeat.73 Shortly thereafter, the Slovenian quest for independence received international 
recognition. 
In contrast to Slovenia's move towards independence, Croatia's quest proved to 
be more difficult. Serbia let Slovenia go because there was no Serbian minority in the 
republic, but Croatia, with a 12% Serbian population,74 would not be let go so easily. 
Even before Croatia's declaration of independence, the Serb minority in Croatia clearly 
stated that they would not be ruled by a Croatian government nor take part in the 
dismemberment of Yugoslavia. As Lenard Cohen points out: 
the leadership of the republic's large Serbian minority in the Krajina regiol\ had stated 
unequivocally that they had no intention of accepting l'Ule from an independe11t Croatian 
government in Zagreb. The Krajina Serbs also made it clear th~t they would not acquiesce 
in either the dismemberment of the Yugoslav federation or the fragmentation of the country's 
Serbian population into various new state units. 75 
As a result, when Croatia disclosed its desire to leave the federationt a conflict erupted 
with the Croatian military and police on one sidet and the Croatia-based Serbs and the 
Serbian led JNA on the other. The conflict continued throughout 1991 and into 1992 and 
eventually, after the European Community brokered thirteen unsuccessful cease-fires, the 
matter was turned over to the United Nations Security Council.76 A United Nations 
negotiating team, led by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vancet was successful in 
negotiating a truce between the two sides. In March 1992, a peacekeeping force (United 
Nations Protection Force-UNPROFOR I) was deployed in Croatia.71 However, by the 
time the UN force was deployed, the Serbs had already gained control over one third of 
Croatian territory. 78 Despite the trucet and the arrival of peacekeepers in Croatiat 
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sporadic fighting continued. However, by the spring of 1992 the attention of the Serbs, 
Croats, and the international community began to tum towards the republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 79 
The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a virtually landlocked state80 with only approximately eight 
miles of coastline along the Adriatic Sea, is bound by Croatia to the north, west, and 
southwest, by Serbia to the east and by Montenegro to the Southeast (Note Map 2). The 
region of Bosnia was settled by the Slavs in the seventh century and in the middle of the 
fifteenth century Bosnia annexed Herzegovina and both these territories were later 
captured by the Turks. In 1878 the Congress of Berlin placed Bosnia and Herzegovina 
under the administration of the Austro-Hungarian empire with Turkey retaining formal 
sovereignty. In 1908 the regions were annexed by the Austro-Hungarian empire which 
soon thereafter collapsed during World War I. In 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes was created and it included the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This state 
was invaded by Italy and Germany during World War II. The defeat of the Axis Powers 
set the stage for the creation of a new Communist-Party dominated state and in 
November 1945 Bosnia-Herzegovina became a republic of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia under the leadership of Tito.81 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 82 one of the most ethnically mixed republics of former 
Yugoslavia, has always been considered a potential hot spot for conflict. When Tito 
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devised the outlines for his new Yugoslavia, the republic of Bosnia presented a problem. 
Aware that both the Serbs and Croats laid claims to the area, Tito declared that "its 
future would be neither Serbian nor Croatian nor Muslim but rather Serbian and Croatian 
and Muslim. "83 The Muslims, descendants of Slavs who converted to Islam when the 
region was captured and taken over by the Ottoman empire, were the largest ethnic group 
in pre-war Bosnia constituting 43.7% of the population. They speak the same language 
as the Serbs and Croats (Serbo-Croatian) but they consider themselves to be a separate 
people because of their religion and culture. 84 The two other major groups in pre-war 
Bosnia were the Serbs and the Croats who comprised 31.3% and 17.3%, respectively, 
of the total population.8s Despite the fact that the Muslims, Serbians, and Croatians 
represented over 90% of the total population there were very few areas throughout pre-
war Bosnia which were ethnically pure as the groups were intermingled and scattered 
throughout the region. In describing the ethnic composition and make up of pre-war 
Bosnia, President Izetbegovic compared it to the skin of a leopard with each spot 
representing a separate group. 86 
The political division of Bosnia, which would later escalate into an armed 
conflict, began with the 1990 Bosnian election. 87 The election made it clear that the 
Bosnians had already divided themselves along ethnic lines: a Muslim nationalist party, 
a Croatian nationalist party, and a Serbian nationalist party. Each received a percentage 
of the vote that was slightly less than the ethnic percentage of the total population.t~ 
Neither of the three parties had a sufficient majority to take office, so they agreed to 
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form a coalition government in which "the president of a seven·member Presidency was 
to be Muslim, the president of the assembly a Serb, and the head of the republican 
government a Croat. "89 Alija lzetbegovic has been the pres~dent of the Bosnian 
tripartite government since his election on December 21, 1990. He was re·elected by 
members of the Presidency in 1991 and his term in office was automatically extended in 
December 1992 because of a state of emergency. 90 
The coalition gov\!mment set up by the three groups initially seemed successful 
but with the growing violence and hostility between the Serbs and Croats in Croatia and 
the increasing uncertainty over the future of Bosnia, ethnic tensions in the republic were 
becoming strained. The differing ideas on the future of Bosnia strained relations even 
farther. 
(T]he population divided largely along ethnic lines over the future course: Croat& opting 
either for an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina or for one that was sovereign in a 
confederation with Yugoslavia, Serbs calling for the retention of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
a Yugoslav federation, and Muslims wanting a sovereign republic in a weak federation.91 
The first signs of serious trouble began in October 1991, when the Croatian and Muslim 
representatives of the Bosnian legislature adopted a memorandum which supported 
Bosnia's sovereignty and its neutrality in the Croatian war.92 The Serbian members of 
the Bosnian parliament did not support this me~"randum and in November 1991 they 
held their own referendum on whether to remain as part of the Yugoslav federation. The 
results were conclusive as the majority of Bosnian Serbs voted in favour of remaining 
within Yugoslavia. 93 
In December 1991, Bosnian President Izetbegovic, in accordance with an 
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agreement made by Muslims and Croats, applied for EC recognition.94 In response to 
this request, the EC suggested that the Bosnian legislature hold a referendum on 
independence to determine whether the population supported such a measure. The Serbs, 
however, continued to maintain that it was their desire to remain part of the Yugoslav 
federation and in January 1992 they declared the formation of their own republic in 
Bosnia, formally known as the Serbian Republic of Bosnia. 95 The February 29-March 
1 referendum, which was boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs, indicated that 99.7% of those 
who voted favoured an independent and sovereign Bosnia. 96 As Bosnia moved closer 
and closer towards independence, the Serbs started preparing for wa". JNA forces began 
withdrawing from Croatia and re-positioning themselves and their equipment in Bosnia 
along side the Bosnian Serb forces. 97 
While ethnic dissension in Bosnia was steadily on the rise since the beginning of 
the Croatian war, the violence in Bosnia seemed to be ignited on March 1, 1992 when 
members of a Serbian wedding party, who 'lit:re waving Serbian flags in a Muslim area 
of Sarajevo, were shot at by unidentified gunmen.98 Within hours of this incident the 
Serbs set up barricades in and around the area of Sarajevo and the resulting conflict 
eventually spread to other parts of Bosnia. As the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian 
government were faced with the possibility of separation due to Bosnian independence, 
they resorted to every means possible, including the use of force, to prevent this from 
becoming a reality. As Lenard Cohen points out, 
Faced with the real possibility that Bosnian Serbs-the former country's largest diasporic 
Serbian community-would become formally separated from Serbia proper, the Belgrade 
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government, Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and JNA forces in the republic ~hared a common 
determination to use force as a means to forestall such an eventuality.'" 
As a result of the fighting that broke out during the referendum, the EC's 
response to its outcome was initially sluggish. However, with the situation in Bosnia 
deteriorating, the EC and United States recognized Bosnian independence in early April 
1992.uJO It was the hope of the EC and the United States that recognition of Bosnia 
would prevent further hostilities and stabilize the situatic-n. But their hopes were dashed 
as a full-scale armed conflict began immediately after Bosnia was recognized by the 
international community. Bosnian Serbs, aided by the JNA, began a reign of terror and 
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and by the summer of 1992 a three sided civil war was in full 
tilt. The Croats sided with the Muslims but not before President Tudjman of Croatia 
carved out his own piece of Bosnia, while Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia, 
supported the Bosnian Serbs. 101 
Eventually, Milosevic ordered the JNA out of Bosnia but when they retreated they 
left behind a multitude of weapons for the Bosnian Serbs, and before long the well armed 
Bosnian Serb forces captured large amounts of territory. By July 1992, with Serbian 
forces occupying two-thirds of the territory, the Bosnian Croats declared a "Croatian 
Community of Herceg-Bos" on the remaining third of Bosnia.100 The Muslims were 
left with a very small territory. For the next two years, ethnic cleansing, fierce and 
brutal conflicts, destruction of villages, towns and cities, broken cease-fires and promises 
and rejections of peace plans would take place daily in Bosnia. 
The political landscape of the former Yugoslavia has vastly changed since its 
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destruction began in 1991. A third, and much smaller Yugoslavia, commonly referred 
to as "rump Yugoslavia," has been constructed between Serbia and Montenegro which 
has yet to be recognized by the international community; Slovenia and Croatia have 
achieved full recognition as independent states; the war in Slovenia and Croatia has 
ceased but the latter remains under an uneasy cease-fire; Macedonia has, to date, 
successfully avoidoo becoming engulfed by the war while its independence has tentatively 
been ackr.owledged pending an acceptable solution with Greece over its name.1113 
Bosnia's independc;nce has received recognition but it is far from becoming an 
independent and effective member of the international community. Moreover, its 
ongoing conflict has the potential to destabilize the whole ex-Yugoslav area. The 
Bosnian conflict is an extension of the former war in Croatia as both Serbia and Croatia 
have irredenta in Bosnia and both Serbian and Croatian nationalists have claimed that it 
should be theirs. 104 For these reasons, a Bosnian settlement is the key to a Serb-Croat 
agreement and an overall solution to the situation in Yugoslavia.105 Until a peaceful 
and lasting settlement is achieved in Bosnia the remaining areas in ex-Yugoslavia remain 
in danger of becoming engulfed by an armed conflict. 
Initiii~ives toward UN Involvement in Yugoslavia: Conflict in Croatia and the 
Creat;on of UNPKOFOR 
How and why the United Nations becomes involved in a peacekeeping operation 
affects the mission's design, mandate, and chances of success.106 Typically, the United 
32 
Nations becomes involved through a treaty '::ith the host scate or states involved, which 
lays out the mandate, length of the mission, and the financial arrangements. It is 
important to note however, that with respeet to some operations, such as those sanctioned 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, a treaty between the UN and the host state(s) is 
not necessarily a requirement. Of the 33 UN peacekeeping operations to date, the vast 
majority have arisen from brokered requests. 107 Brokered requests are the result of 
talks between the warring factions which are mediated by outside parties. The United 
States, Russia, Tanzania, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of 
American States (OAS), and the UN have all acted as mediators to help achieve cease-
fires and peace plans. 108 Once an agreement is achieved the parties then frequently 
turn to the United Nations for its assistance in implementing its terms. 
Security Council initiatives have resulted in the creation of six peacekeeping 
operations. 109 All six have been the result of wars in the Middle East in which the 
Security Council took the initiative to demand a cease· fire and followed up by deploying 
a peacekeeping mission.110 The third way for the United Nations to become involved 
in a peacekeeping operation is through local requests by the disputant parties. Local 
requests simply involve the parties appealing to the UN for the deployment of a 
peacekeeping force on their territory. 
When fighting broke out in Yugoslavia, the European Community saw the crisis 
as an opportunity to show the world that it was upable of adequately dealing with the 
conflict. 111 The United States and other principal powers initially backed the efforts 
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of the European Community in its lead role because they beHeved that the EC could use 
its economic influence during the crisis. Since the early 1970s, the EC and Yugoslavia 
were developing strong economic ties and it was thought that sanctions might prove to 
be an effective instrument in the crisis. 112 But problems soon began to surface as a 
split emerged within the EC on how to respond to the crisi-.. The majority of EC 
members were pushing for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia but others, such as 
Germany and Austria, were willing and ready to recognize the breakaway republics of 
Croatia and Slovenia. 113 Despite this internal split, the EC members were intent on 
declaring this crisis as theirs and, in fact, the EC did not even want the UN to be 
involved} 14 In testifying before a British Parliamentary Committee on December 10, 
1992, Lord Owen, the former British Foreign Secretary, said: 
the Unic.ed States did not want to be involved in Yugoslavia and the Europeans did not nant 
them to be involved if truth be told. The European Community were very happy this should 
be a European event to the extent of us developing our own peacekeeping operation and we 
were not too keen to involve the UN.11' 
The UN also refrained from intervening because a region~ organization, the EC, 
was already involved in the crisis. 116 In fact, Article 52 of the UN Charter requires 
members of the United Nations to first resort to regional organizations or agencies to 
achieve pacific settlement of a dispute before referring it to the Security Council. In a 
interview on February 11, 1993, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed the 
UN's view on EC involvement in Yugoslavia: 
According to Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, regional disputes are supposed to be solved at 
the regional level, so we abstained from intervening because there already was a regional 
organization involved .... In fact our position in Yug011lavia was that because the E.C. had 
established a framework and was doing something-it was doing real work, promoting a peace 
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process-then we would not intervene. 117 
In fact, the United Nations was not the only one that did not want to get involved in the 
crisis. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was initially 
involvai in the dispute but delegated its authority to the EC, the United States left the 
crisis in the hands of the EC to avoid becoming involved in another Lebanon, while the 
USSR's leaders were too busy trying to keep their own country together.m Therefore, 
as Stephen Griffiths points out, the Yugoslav conflict "became an excellent opportunity 
to conduct an experiment on the feasibility of a common EC foreign and security 
policy ... 119 
The EC responded to the crisis by offering mediation and good offices but its 
efforts proved futile as each negotiated truce was violated almost immediately after, and 
sometimes even before, the papers were signed. The EC member states, from the 
beginning of the conflict, were unwilling to commit troops in sufficient numbers to 
enforce peace in the former Yugoslavia. Containment of the conflict, through a limited 
military deployment, became the effective, though not the declared policy, of EC 
member states. With countless broken cease-fires, escalating violence, and the reluctance 
of the EC to intervene militarily, it soon became apparent that the European Community 
was not sufficiently capable and unified to adequately respond to the crisis and it opted 
to request the assistance of the United Nations.120 
The United Nations became actively involved in the Yugoslav crisis on September 
25, 1991, when the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, unanimously passed 
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Resolution 713 which called for a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of 
weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia .... " Before the passing of resolution 713, 
there was some debate about whether the UN had the right to intervene in the Yugoslav 
crisis, since it was an internal conflict.121 Two principal reasons were advanced to 
justify intervention: firstly, UN Security Council invo1v~ment was requested by the 
former Yugoslavia and, secondly, the conflict was deemed to be a threat to international 
peace and security. 122 While Article 2(7) states that nothing in the present Charter 
shall authorize the UN to intervene in a dispute that is considered to be of a domestic 
nature, it also states that this article shall not prevent the UN from applying measures 
under Chapter VII}23 By invoking the last part of Article 2(7), and with the full 
support of all the permanent members of the Security Council, the UN was able to 
declare the continued fighting in Yugoslavia as a threat to international peace and security 
and invoke Article 39 of Chapter VII. 124 
Under resolution 713, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to offer 
his assistance in an effort to peacefully resolve the dispute. In response to this request, 
Secretary-General Javier Per~z de Cuellar, who would be replaced at the end of 1991 by 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, appointed Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State for the United 
States, as his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia on October 8, 1991.125 At a November 
23 meeting that was convened by Mr. Vance in Geneva, the Presidents of Serbia and 
Croatia together with the JNA reached an agreement that called for an immediate cease-
fire. At this meeting each of the Yugoslav parties stated that they wanted to see the 
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immediate establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation. 126 In response to this 
request the Security Council adopted, on November 27, 1991, resolution 721 which 
approved the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, subject to some necessary 
conditions being met. The necessary conditions were compliance with the agreement 
signed in Geneva on November 23. 127 
In mid December 1991, under resolution 724, the Security Council declared that 
the conditions for a peacekeeping operation still did not exist but authorized the 
deployment of several military and civilian personnel to Yugoslavia "as part of the 
continuing mission ... to carry forward preparations for possible deployment of a 
peacekeeping operation ... .''128 When 1991 came to a close, the chances for a 
peacekeeping operation remained grim as fighting between the JNA and Croatian forces 
continued, but it appeared that the new year would bring about a cease-fire and the 
possible establishment of a peacekeeping operation. On January 3, 1992, in Sarajevo, 
representatives from Croatia and Serbia signed the Implementing Accord which called 
for the full implementation of the November 23, 1991, Geneva agreement. 129 In 
response to this new agreement, the Security Council immediately adopted resolution 727 
which authorized the deployment of 50 military observers to help maintain the shaky and 
often violated cease-fire contained in the Accord. 130 Despite the so called cease-fire 
the conditions for the full deployment of a peacekeeping operation still did not exist. 
Although President Tudjman of Croatia objected to certain technical aspects of 
the UN plan, he reiterated Croatia's support for the peacekeeping mission. 131 The UN 
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also received assurance~ for cooperation with its plan from Slobodan Milosevic, president 
of Serbia, and General Blagoje Adzic, Chief of the Gen~.;ral Staff of the JNA.132 Even 
though the plan was supported by Serbia and provisionally supported by the Croatian 
government, the deployment of the peacekeepers appeared to be in jeopardy as the Serbs 
in Croatia had some reservations. Milan Babic, President of the Serbian Krajina, and 
Goran Hadzic, Prime Minister of the Serbian Region of Eastern Slovenia, objected to the 
fact that the peacekeeping plan referred to their areas as being within Croatia. They 
argued that the plan prejudged the political situation. 133 However, despite these 
objections, the Secretary-General recommended that the full deployment of the UN 
peacekeeping operation commence immediately. When making this recommendation, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali concluded that, 
the danger that a United Nations peace·lceeping operation will fail because of lack of co-
operation from the parties is less grievous than the danger that dcla)" in its dispatch will lead 
to a breakdown of the cease-fire and to a new conflagration in Yugoslavia.1,. 
Despite the fact that certain political groups were still opposed to a UN peacekeeping 
operation, the Security Council, on February 21, 1992, under resolution 743, established 
the United Nations Protection Force to assist the local parties with the i!Tlplementation 
of the cease-fire plan. 135 Shortly thereafter, on March 8, UNPROFOR I began to 
deploy under the command of Indian General Salish Nambiar and on April 7, 1992, the 
Security Council adopted resolution 749, authorizing the full deployment of the United 
Nations Protection Force.136 
While the Yugoslavs accepted a UN brokered peace plan, it is important to note 
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that they did not accept the United Nations solely on basis of its ability to adequately deal 
with the crisis. Both the Serbs and Croat~ viewed the UN's Personal Envoy, Cyrus 
Vance, more as a representative of the United States rather than as a representative of 
the United Nations.137 Since both groups were eager to gain the support of the United 
States for their cause, it made sense to both the Serbs and Croats to accept the pt-ace plan 
brokered by Cyrus Vance. The Yugoslavs saw the Vance mission as an opportunity to 
use the UN in order attain American support.138 Besides winning American support, 
the Serbs and the JNA, who already controlled large parts of Croatia, were battle weary 
and they reg~oed the Vance brokered p.:.:4ce plan as a tactical compromise. 139 At the 
time, both sides, although for different reasons, wanted to stop fighting, and a 
peacekeeping operation, under the auspices of the UN, seemed to be the most acceptable 
avenue of choice. 
Initiatives toward UN Involvement in Bosnia 
Due to the conflicting Serb-Croat ambitions over Bosnia, it was only a matter of 
time before the conflict in Croatia spilled over into Bosnia. Even before the February 
29-March 1, 1992 referendum on Bosnian independence, tensions between the region's 
three largest ethnic groups, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, ran high. Despite the fact 
that the leaders of the three groups agreed to respect the borders of the republic, the 
Bosnian Serbs began seizing parts of Bosnia with the ultimate aim of uniting them with 
Serbia. 140 As the fighting grew worse, the situation continued to deteriorate in Bosnia 
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and when the republic was recognized by the international comm,mity in early April 1992 
the violence escalated into a full scale armed conflict. 141 
Again, as was the case with the initial Yugoslav conflict, the EC was to 
embark on a repeat performance of the political pirouette which surrounded the Slovene and 
Croat crisis, with one difference: instead of searching for an 'European' response to start 
with, only to turn the entire problem to the UN later, the EC started first with the UN this 
time.141 
On April 10, 1992 the UN requested Cyrus Vance to travel to Bosnia to assess the 
situation and recommend what could be done to quell the hostilities.143 Although the 
mandate of UNPROFOR was initially associated with Croatia only, it was envisioned that 
after the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs)144 100 
military observers would be re-deployed to areas of Bosnia.145 On April 23 the three 
ethnic groups in Bosnia signed a cease-fire in which they agreed to observe a previous 
cease-fire signed on April 12, but the truce began to break down almost immediately 
after it was endorsed. 146 In light of the rapidly deteriorating situation, the Secretary-
General, while not being able to deploy a full peacekeeping force, decided to accelerate 
the deployment of the UNPROFOR observers in Croatia by dispatching 40 military 
observers to Bosnia in the regions of Mostar, Caplijina, Stolac, and Trebinje.l47 Their 
task was to assess the possibility of a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. 
The deployment of the observers to Bosnia was a result of continued pressure of 
the international community, mainly of members of the EC, to expand UNPROFOR's 
operation into Bosnia to prevent further hostilities. 148 Even though there was not a 
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, there were UNPROFOR personnel already there. 
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When UNPROFOR was established in Croatia, the United Nations decided to place the 
operation's headquarters in Sarajevo in the hopes of preventing any further hostilities, 
but the plan did not work. 149 While pressure grew to expand UNPROFOR into Bosnia, 
the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in that republic seemed bleak for two 
reasons. First, President Bush was reluctant to ask Congress for additional peacekeeping 
funds, so it seemed that if an operation were to be established in Bosnia the Europeans 
would have go it alone with respect to finances; and, secondly, Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
stated that a peacekeeping mission would not be deployed as long as the parties continued 
fighting. 15° Confrontations between the three sides continued in the middle of May 
and, due to intense altercations between the warring parties, the military observers were 
withdrawn from Bosnia and redeployed back to Croatia. 1s1 Also, about two thirds of 
UNPROFOR I headquarters personnel, who were stationed in Sarajevo, were forced to 
withdraw leaving the task of negotiating a cease-fire to the remaining one third. 152 
The fighting quickly grew worse in Bosnia and so did the humanitarian situation 
as inten:;e sh~lling of Sarajevo forced the closure of the airport to relief operations. 153 
In rec;ponse to the deteriorating situation, the United Nations, on May 15, 1992, passed 
resolution 752 which demanded an immediate end to the fighting and ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia. The resolution also called for the immediate cessation of all outside activities 
and welcomed the efforts of the European Community to reach a peaceful solution.1s.c 
On May 27, 1992, Mr. Haris Silajdzic, then Minister of Foreign Affairs for Bosnia, who 
later became the Prime Minister, addressed a letter to the President of the Security 
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Council requesting assistance to end the fighting and ease the suffering of the 
population. ISS In keeping with the request of the Security Council in resolution 757, 
UNPROFOR continued to negotiate with the parties in an effort to put a stop to 
hostilities around the airport and re-open it for humanitarian reasons.156 On June 5, 
1992, UNPROFOR negotiated a settlement with the local parties for the handing over of 
the Sarajevo airport to a UN force. With this agreement, the Security Council, under 
resolution 758, extended UNPROFOR's mandate to include the re-opening of the airport 
and the supervision of the withdrawal uf heavy weapons from the area with an additional 
1,100 troops. 157 With this resolution, UNPROFOR II in Bosnia was established.m 
The UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia has been one of the most difficult and 
challenging in the history of UN peacekeeping. Two personal experiences, involving 
form(.r UN commanders, illustrate the nature of the problems UNPROFOR personnel 
have had to confront. For the first of these, we have an "insider's" account which 
provides us with a helpful introduction to the development of UNPROFOR's role in 
Bosnia. Major-General Lewis MacKenzie of the Canadian Armed Forces, who served 
as chief of staff with UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and later as the Bosnian 
commander during 1992, has written a memoir which takes us step-by-step through the 
completion of UNPROFOR's first task - the re-opening of Sarajevo airport for 
humanitarian reasons. 159 
On June 5, 1992, a trilateral agreement was reached between the UN, the Bosnian 
Presidency, and the Bosnian Serb army that called for the airport to be demilitarized and 
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placed under UN .c;upervision for the delivery of humanitarian aid. But the signing of the 
trilateral agreement proved to be the easy part, implementing it would be a much more 
difficult process. One of the first problem~ encountered was getting the necessary troops 
to take control of the Sarajevo airport. The airport agreement called for a thousand man 
hattalion to take on this task, but MacKenzie realized that it might possibly take a month 
before a battalion could be found and moved into Sarajevo. By that time, he feared that 
all of the good work on the airport agreement would be history.160 After some 
discussion between MacKenzie and General Nambiar, former Force Commander of 
UNPROFOR, it was decided that a Canadian battalion would be sent to Sarajevo. 
MacKenzie then persuaded Nambiar, and eventually the UN headquarters in New York 
and his own in Ottawa, to establish a new sector headquarters in Sarajevo that he would 
command. 161 
When MacKenzie was in the process of putting his team together to travel to 
Sarajevo, he received reports from the city that the fighting was growing worse as 
reports of the UN take over of the airport became more public. According to him, this 
a regrettable characteristic of peacekeeping missions because 
anytime there is a chance that UN action will freeze the status quo on the ground, the parties 
to the conflict go on a last-minute offensive to make 1111 many territorial gains 1111 po1111ible 
before the appointed time for the cease-fire arrives.'112 
On June 10, MacKenzie and his advance force left Croatia and started to move towards 
Sarajevo by convoy. They made good progress until they hit an area outside of Pale, 
· . . -ne of the Bosnian Serb government led by Dr.Karadzic. The closer MacKenzie and 
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his team got to Pale "the more belligerent the sentries at the roadblock became. In one 
case, the sentry kept mutterin&, 'MacKenzie die.' "163 
In another incident on the same day, MacKenzie overheard Serbian soldiers at a 
roadblock saying that "MacKenzie won't take the airport from us. We will kill you all 
if you try. "164 He confronted the soldiers at this particular roadblock and tried to set 
the story straight regarding the UN takeover of the airport. He explained to them that 
the UN was coming to Sarajevo to implement an agreement signed by Dr. Karadzic and 
their '' ·. ~.tary commander, General Mladic. MacKenzie said his explanation seemed to 
satisfy them but he was disturbed by 
some insulting references they made to Karadzic and Mladic. Their anger seemed more 
directed at them than me. They explained that 11 \ot of their colleagues had been killed 
securing the airport, and so they shouldn't have <o give it up. 165 
MacKenzie and his compatriots, after encountering a couple of more incidents akin to the 
ones described above, arrived in Sarajevo on June 11. 
Before the airport agreement could be implemented a cease-fire was needed and 
MacKenzie, therefore, immediately began negotiating a truce between the local factions. 
On June 14, after hours of discussion between the Bosnian Presidency and the Bosnian 
Serbs, both sides a.:oreed to sign a cease-fire with MacKenzie, but not with each other. 
The cease-fire was to go into effect at 0600 hours the next day .166 It lasted only 40 
hours as the fighting resumed in and around Sarajevo on June 17 at 0500 hours and 
continued until the early part of July. 
Besides the continual fighting between the local factions, UNPROFOR's image 
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of impartiality was another problem that hampered the implementation of the airport 
agreement. During MacKenzie's attempts to implement the agreement, UNPROFOR was 
viewed by some Muslims and several members of the Bosnian Presidency as being pro-
Serb. This appearance of partiality resulted in several problems, especially with regard 
to cooperation with UNPROFOR. After one particular incident on June 22, in which the 
UN was accused of giving vehicles to the Serbs to transport their soldiers, MacKenzie 
met with the Bosnian Presidency to try and convince them that he and his troops were 
impartial and not pro-Serb: 
you are convinced that I and my troops are pro-Serb. 1 can tell you that this is not the cw;e, 
but you won't believe me. We are not here to pass judgement on what is going on. We 
send objective reports to the UN everyday. It's the UN'a job to identify the culprits. Our 
job is to open the airport and ensure the delivery of food and medicine. To do that, wo have 
to negotiate with you and the Bosnian Serbs. If you can't live with that then my role as a 
negotiator is impossible. I need your cooperation .. .( also need you to tone down the anti-
UNPROFOR rhetoric in the media. My command is committed to doing everything within 
our capability and our mandate to assist the people of Sarajevo, hut we can't succeed with'l•!~ 
your co-operation.1111 
MacKenzie said that every time he made pitch like this, he had the distinc-~ feeling that 
President lzetbegovic believed him and accepted that he was impartial, but he never had 
the same impression regarding Vice-President Ganic or Minister Doko. 1611 Some 
Muslims civilians also viewed MacKenzie and his troops as being partial. On June 26, 
1992, he received a fax from the "Citizens of Dobrinja" who wanted him to be tried as 
a war criminal. He said he read the fax twice, in the hopes of undcrsLar.ding how the 
citizens could have misunderstood UNPROFOR's actions and mandate, which were 
designed to help all Sarajevo citizens. 169 
Eventually on June 29, after countless negotiation sessions and meetings between 
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the local factions and the UN, the Bosnian Serbs handed the airport over to 
UNPROFOR. The Serb5' decision to relinquish control of the airport seemed to be 
sparked by an unexpected six hour visit by France's President Mitterand to Sarajevo 
airport in which he met with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadzic. Mitterand's June 28th visit seemed to be significant for two reasons; 
firstly, as in the words of Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, it provided the momentum 
for the handing over of the airport, and secondly, within two hours of UNPROFOR's 
takeover of the airport on June 29, France initiated the airlift by sending one of its planes 
into Sarajevo carrying ten tonnes of food. 170 
The landing of the French military plane and the visit by Mitterand provided the 
needed push to overcome the reluctance of the international community to get involved 
in Bosnia. 171 Shortly after the arrival of the French plane, the UN airlift to Sarajevo 
hit full stride on July 3 as ten planes carrying 100 tones of aid landed at the airport. 
Once France initiated the airlift, other states, such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Norway, and Sweden began to take part in the airlift.172 
Another experience which highlights the difficulties UNPROFOR has faced in Bosnia 
occur":c>..d in March 1993 and involved the French military officer, Lieutenant-General 
Phillipe Morillon, commander of the Bosnian operation at the time. Later UNPROFOR 's 
mandate will be examined more closely, but in order to properly understand the 
development discussed here, it should be mentioned that the UN Security Council passed 
resolutions in late 1992 and early 1993 that called for UNPROFOR "to use such force 
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as necessary to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid" and to establish a number of 
"safe havens" for Bosnian Muslims. 
On March 10, General Morillon set out to visit Srebrenica where 60,000 Muslims 
were under attack for several months by Serbian forces. 173 When he entered the town 
with a UN medical team on March 11, he was surrounded and detained by thousands of 
desperate Muslim women, children and old people who feared that the town was going 
to fall to the Serbs.174 Due to the actions of the Muslims, Morillon, on March 13, 
decided on his own to stay with the refugees to calm them and "try to save them. "m 
He set up his headquarters in the local post office and promised to stay with the people 
of Srebrenica, under intense shelling, until the Serbian forces opened supply routes to 
relief convoys and allowed the evacuation of sick and wounded Muslims. 176 Morillon 
said, "I will stay here among these people until the day that their survival is 
assured."177 He immediately began trying to persuade Serbian forces lO allow aid 
convoys into Srebrenica. 
At several times throughout the initial stages of his ordeal in Srebrenica, 
Morillon negotiated deals with the Serbs to allow the passage of aid convoys into the 
town but the Serbian military halted the trucks once they moved a few miles into 
Bosnia. 171 For example, on March 15, he negotiated a deal with General Ratko 
Mladic, military commander of the Bosnian Serbs, for the passage of aid into Srebrenica 
and the evacuation of about thirty wounded citizens.179 But this deal feH apart on 
March 18 when the aid convoy was stopped at a Serbian checkpoint. The local Serbian 
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commander said that he had no directions to allow a convoy through and he ordered the 
trucks to leave and warned he would "shoot to kill" any UN troops who tried to pass 
through his area again. 180 As the situation in Srebrenica quickly deteriorated, Morillon 
kept up his efforts to persuade the Serbs to allow aid convoys into the town. Eventually, 
the Serbs yielded and allowed the passage of an aid convoy into Srebrenica. 181 
Even after the arrival the aid convoy into Srebrenica, Morillon still did not leave 
the town. He said that the humanitarian aid brought people life but the arrival of a 
single relief convoy did not fulfil his goal of obtaining a cease-fire and assurances from 
the Serbs that regular uninterrupted convoys would be allowed to travel into Srebrenica 
and that the sick and wounded would be permitted to be cvacuated.182 On March 26, 
Morillon worked out a deal with Mladic for a cease-fire and for the opening of a supply 
route to Srebrenica. The deal would permit a relief convoy of trucks to travel into the 
town on March 27, and ~r.ce unloaded, the trucks would be used to transport women and 
children to th~ Muslim held town of Tuzla.183 On the basis of this cease-fire and other 
measures worked out with the Serbian military, Morillon agreed to leave Srebrenica 
saying, "I said I would not leave before the conditions for security in Srebrenica were 
established ... .I am now satisfied that there is an agreement on a cease-fire and on the 
opening of a humanitarian aid C1nvoy to the town. "184 On March 28, after the cease-
fire went into effect and the convoy arrived in Srebrenica, Morillon returned to his 
headquarters in Sarajevo proclaiming "Srebrenica is safe." us Morillon' s arrival in 
Srebrenica, and his decision to remain there until he thought the town was safe, marked 
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the beginning of a personal three week crusade that could very well have saved it from 
a Serbian takeover. Indeed, the Muslim citizens of Srebrenica concur, as they believe 
that Morillon's decision to stay in Srebrenica saved the town from a destructive fate at 
the hands of the Serbs. tsc. 
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CHAPTER 4 - EVALUATING TJIE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE 
IN BOSNIA 
What determines the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation? The nature 
of the conflict, the degree of local and international support, the clarity and scope of the 
mandate, funding, and the operational aspects of a mission determine the feasibility and 
effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation.187 It is these matters which will be 
examined to assess the effectiveness and feasibility of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. 
MANDATE 
A mandate simply spells out the duties of a peacekeeping operation. The two 
most important characteristics of a mandate are its clarity and scope. The scope of a 
mandate is the purpose of the operation, what it is asked to do, while its clarity refers 
to how clearly the mission is defined. The mandate can affect the success of an 
operation in several ways. Firstly, with a clear and precise mandate there is less room 
for interpretation and thus less disagreement among the involved parties over the 
operation's purpose. Secondly, a clear mandate helps ensure the continued support of 
the operation from both the local disputants and the international community. Paul Diehl 
points out that 
(iln order to &Wing the weight of domestic and international public opinion behind a 
peacekeeping operation, the force must have clearly identifiable goals and duties. Without 
those, the public may not understand why the troops are there or may question the validity 
of the peacekeeping strategy in the situation at band.1a 
But while a clear and precise mandate are important for successful peacekeeping, the 
nature of the conflict and political support appear to have a greater effect on the 
mission's degree of success. William Durch contends that 
[a)n ambiguous or incomplete mandate can indeed make 1t straightforward miMion difficult, 
or a difficult mission impossible, but the clearest mandate in the world ciUlnot make an 
impossible mission feasible. It merely paints the impossible task in high-contrast colors. 119 
A peacekeeping operation's mandate tends to be a mirror image of the political 
situation of the Security Council. Strong, clear, and precise mandates show that the 
Great Powers have similar interests in the conflict while broad and vague mandates art' 
usually a reflection of their conflicting interests. 190 With conflicting interests, each of 
the potential veto users is usually willing to let the operation proceed, as long as the 
mandate permits the desired interpretation by the veto-holders. But with this type of 
mandate, the chances for success are significantly lowered. When e:t. force is not 
experiencing success, the United Nation is left with three options: revise the mandate, 
leave the peacekeepers in the area with an unrevised man,~ate, or withdraw them.191 
The first two options are used most frequently while the third option remains an 
unpopular choice for the UN. 
The mandate of UNPROFOR in Br:~nia is clearly that of a second generation type 
peacekeeping mission (Note Table l- Resolutions Establishing UNPROFOR's Mandate). 
While the monitoring of a no-fly zone and escorting and protectiGg convoys are new jobs 
for post-Cold War peacekeepers, the other aspec£S of UNPROFOR's mandate are also 
more akin to second generation rather than traditional peacekeeping; the mission is being 
carried out in the middle of a conflict; it has been authorized to use all necessary means 
to carry out its mandate;192 it is providing protection to declared "safe areas;" and a 
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regional organization, NATO, has been authorized to assist UNPROFOR in carrying out 
its mandate. It also has two other aspects that rraditional operations cannot claim: it is 
an extension of the first ever peacekeeping mission on European soil'93 and, for the 
second time in peacekeeping history (UNPROFOR in Croatia being the first), Russia has 
contributed troops to the m;ssion.194 Indeed, the operation is like no other and Bosnia 
could very well be the testing ground for future operations similar to UNPROFOR. 
The overall mandate of UNPROFOR can be summarized quite simply as 
alleviation of the suffering of Bosnia's civilian population. Every enlargement of the 
mandate, including using all necessary means to escort convoys or protecting the safe 
areas, was intended to alleviate the civilian population from the effects of the ongoing 
war. The mandatt~ of UNPROFOR was established by a series of Security Council 
Resolutions between June 1992 and June 1993 and its primary tasks include: 
-ensuring the security and functioning of the Sarajevo airpon. This included 
withdrawal of the local forces from in and around the airport and relocation of their 
heavy weapons under the supervision of UNPROFOR.195 
-esconing and protecting humanitarian convoys. Due to great difficulties in carrying 
out this part of its mandate the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted 
resolution 770 on August 13, 1992 which called on all states to "take nationally or 
through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in 
coordination with the United Nations" the delivery of humanitarian assistance, by the 
relevant humanitarian organizations, to Sarajevo and other needed areas of Bosnia. After 
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some discussion it was decided that this task would be 1;iven to UNPROFOR and in 
September 1992 the Security Council passed Resolution 776 authorizing the enlargement 
of UNPROFOR's mandate to include this task. 196 The expanded duties for 
UNPROFOR included supporting the efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Bosnia and 
to provide protection to the humanitarian relief efforts when and where UNHCR 
considered it necessary. UNPROFOR was also authorized to protect convoys of released 
civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cress (ICRC) requested such 
action and if the Force Commander thought the request was practicable.1on In this 
resolution no mention was made of Chapter VII. 
-monitoring the ban on military jlighrs over the airspace of Bosnia which was imposed 
by the Security Council in resolution 781 on October 9, 1992. After frequent violations 
of this ban the Security Council decided to enforce it. On March 31, 1993, the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted resolution 816 which authoriz:d member-
states, seven days after the ado~~:. . of the resolution, to take nationally or through 
regional arrangements "all necessary measures in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure compliance with the ban 
on flights ... "198 
-protecting the declared "safe areas" of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuz.Ja, Zepa, Gorazde, 
and Bihac which were established by Security Council resolutions 819 of April 16, 1993 
and 824 of May 6, 1993.199 Initially, under resolutions 819 and 824, UNPROFOR was 
only authorized to monitor the humanitarian situation in these declared safe areas. 
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However, due to repeated attacks on these safe areas, the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII, adopted resolution 836 on June 4, 1993, which authorized UNPROFOR 
"acting in self defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in 
reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or the armed incursion 
into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the 
freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys." Resolution 
836 also authorized member states "acting nationally or through regional organizations" 
to take "all necessary measures, through the use of air power" to support UNPROFOR 
in carrying out this part of its mandate.200 Although UNPROFOR was mandated 
several tasks, a large portion of its troops are used to escort and protect humanitarian aid 
convoys. 
The majority of peacekeeping operations, whether Cold War or post-Cold War, 
usually experience problems in the implementation of their mandates and UNPROFOR 
is no exception. By far the major problem impeding UNPROFOR peacekeepers from 
carrying out their mandate has been the lack of consistent cooperation from the local 
parties. This problem will be discussed further in a later section of the paper. While 
the lack of cooperation has been a big obstacle confronting the mandate of UNPROFOR, 
the misunderstanding of its mandate by the news media has also led to some unrealistic 
expectations. The news media has frequently criticized the Bosnian operation as a failure 
because it has been unable to stop the fighting and create peace. But this would require 
a massive peace-enforcement mission not the humanitarian intervention operation 
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UNPROFOR was intended to be . . 
Somehow the mandate of UNPROFOR has been mistakenly interpreted as one of 
preventing the local belligerents from fighting each other. Therefore, because the 
fighting continues or is not stopped, UNPROFOR is labelled as a failure. However, this 
is simply inaccurate as peacekeepers, whether traditional or second generation, are and 
never should be assigned the task of stopping a war. UNPROFOR was new~r mandated 
this task and if the operation has failed it is not because it has been unable to stop the 
fighting. In fact, it would be more ~ppropriate to say that the Security Council and oth\!r 
UN member states have failed to implement the resolutions that were adopted on Bosnia. 
Indeed, the UN has failed in this respect, but UNPROFOR has not, as it has done what 
it can with the limited resources at its disposal. 
The purpose of UNPROFOR has also been misunderstood by both the local 
residents and the government of Bosnia. In a speech to the Conference of Defence 
Associations Institutes ninth annual seminar, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, former 
commander of UNPROFOR, stated that the government of Bosnia did not know how to 
use a peacekeeping force. 201 The official government in Bosnia, under the leadership 
of President Izetbegovic, asked for and got a pe3r.ekeeping force. Howc:.ver, when it 
realized what a peacekeeping force did, the Bosnian government no longer wanted it 
according to MacKenzie and the government then started to blame UN PRO FOR for man" 
of the problems in Bosnia. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's February 1993 report on 
UNPROFOR noted that, 
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UNPROFOR •, effort& in Bosnia and Herz.egovina ba\'e been characterized by a regrettable 
tendency on the part of the host Government to blame it for a variety of shoncomings, 
whether real or imagined. Criticism of UNPROFOR's performance in that Republic bas 
largely heen directed at its failure to fulfil wb that the Force bas not been mandated, 
authorized, ~quipped, staffed or financed to fulfii.2Dl 
Consequently, UNPROFOR was attacked several times by the Government and groups 
accountable to it. both in public speeches and through the use of violence.203 As a 
result of the deliberate physical attacks, UNPROFOR suffered several fatalities. 204 
As was the case with the government, some of the local residents also 
misunderstood the purpose of the UN force in Bosnia. MacKenzie contends that one of 
the "stupidest things" regarding the Bosnian operation was the borrowing of its name 
from the UN operation in Croatia. In explaining the reasoning behind his argument 
MacKenzie said: 
'UNPROFOR,' United Nations Protection Force; up in Croatia to protect the Serbian 
minorities. The Canadian battalion arrives in Sarajevo .... White vehicles, a!J \c!aci.• of good 
stuff. 'United Nations Protection Force.' The expectations of the populatio::. were that it was 
there to protect them and to stop the fighting. Twelve hundred people, surrounded by about 
150,000 to 200,000 people thrashing it out, nailing babies to boards, cutting throats and 
cooking people in ovens. All kinds of neat little things, and they thought we were going to 
stop tbat.:os 
Indeed something as technical as the naming of the force can cause the local population 
to misinterpret its purpose. When the first battalions arrived in Sarajevo, many people 
saw the words "Protection Force" and believed that the peacekeepers were there to stop 
the fighting and protect them, but when the fighting was not stopped some local citizens 
became hostile towards the force. Perhaps a more appropriate name for the force could 
have been the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Force for Civilians (UNHAFC). 
With ~uch a name, the purpose of the operation might have been clear to the local 
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population. 
Any peacekeeping operation, whether traditional or second generation, has a 
better chance of succeeding when its mandate: is clear and realistic. Unfortunately, 
U:N7ROFOR suffers from deficiencies in relation to both criteria. Resolution 836 is a 
prime example as it is unclear as to how the peacekeepers are to protect the safe areas. 
The vagueness surrounding the role of UNPROFOR in the safe areas was addressed in 
a recent report by the Secretary-General: 
is il'> role to defend a geographically defined safe area or is it to deter, through it! presc:nce, 
attacks on the civilian populations living therein? The Security Council clearly intended the 
latter, but a perceived lack of clarity of intent may have contributed to misunderstanding11 and 
false expectations, botll by warring parties and by the international community .... * 
While the Security Council has adopted some unclear resolutions, it also has 
assigned some unrealistic tasks to UNPROFOR. They are unrealistic because the 
Security Council and other UN members have not provided the necessary equipment in 
terms of manpower and logistics to carry out tile tasks contained in the many resolutions. 
Several of the resolutions concerning Bosnia delegate tasks "nationally or through 
regional arrangements" but they do not l'pecify how many troops will be needed, who 
is going to provide them, who is going to pay for them, and when they will be deployed. 
The tendency of Security Council members appears to be one of concluding that just 
because they adopt a resolution saying something should he done that it will somehow 
be done. There exists an immense difference between what the Security Council says 
should be done in Bosnia and the mean~~ employed to carry out the mandated tasks. In 
a December 1993 interview, fonner UNPROFOR commander Lieutenant-General Francis 
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Briquemont commented on this difference by pointing out that there "is a fantastic gap 
between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions and 
the means available to commanders in the field.207 
The former UNPROFOR commander referred to resolution 836 as an example 
of this gap. The Lieutenant-General said that at least 7500 troops would be needed to 
carry out the task of resolution 836 but only 2000 troops were ever deployed to the safe 
areas, and as a result, UNPROFOR's ability to fulfil this task was, and still is, limited 
by its number of troops. The troops were probably not sent because many UN member-
states might have believed that even if 7500 troops were deployed, the Serbs would have 
still pushed towards their military objectives. But it could have also stemmed from the 
fact that some states did not want to commit any more resources, regardless of whether 
the additional troops would have provided any more good. Indeed, the Security Council, 
more than likely, passed resolution 836 with the hope that its adoption alone would prove 
to be enough to deter the Serbian military. In other words, the Security Council might 
have tried to bluff the Serbs by talking tough. If that was the case, it failed as the Serbs 
called the bluff. 
The Bosnian war has shown that adopting or passing resolutions is not sufficient 
to deter unwanted action. In most cases, the local parties involved in the conflict will 
call the bluff or at least test it to a certain limit. In instances where it is tested, the ill-
prepared and insufficiently equipped force will no doubt run into serious difficulties. A 
clear lesson of the Bosnian experience is that the members of the UN Security Council 
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should give the pea::ekeepers the needed resources and manpower to implement Security 
Council resolutions. If the resources are not available then certain types of resolutions 
should not be adopted. 
Another major problem confronting the effective implementation of 
UNPROFOR's mandate is one that confronts all peacekeeping operations that deal with 
internal conflicts. The problem is 
the difficulty of milking peacekeeping work via-a-vis lltmed groups outside the control of 
recognized political authorities with whom the United Nations can conclude the neceAAary 
political and p.-~ctical agreements.201 
UNPROFOR is not th~ only operation that has run into this problem as ONUC in the 
Congo, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and UNOSOM in 
Somalia have all been confronted with this dilemma. Armed groups or breakaway 
factions that are not under any effective political control within Bosnia have created 
problems for both the peacekeepers and the politicians. Two examples can clarify this 
c:rficulty. The first stems from the previously discussed June 1992 airport r~recment 
that opened the way for the deployment of UNPROFOR in Bosnia. After an agreement 
was reached between the parties on the re-opening of the airport, Major-General Lewis 
MacKenzie, UNPROFOR commander at the time, received a call from a Serbian soldier 
who insisted that he and his soldiers commanded the airport and that any attempts by 
MacKenzie and his troops to take it over would result in their death. The conversation 
went as follows: 
Soldier: General MacKenzie, I command 2,000 soldiers in llidza. Many of my people died 
capturing the airport. If you go near the airport, we will kill you . No ''ne will lake the 
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airport from us. We will kill all your people. 
MiiCKenzie: I'm not h~:rt: to take the airport away from you. Your lewlers, Dr. Karadzic and 
G~:neral Mludic, hav~:signed a contract with the UN to hand over the airport to us so we can 
bring in humanitarian aid. This is not my idea, it's yours. 
Soldier: Karadzic and Mladic are fools .. .J command the airport area and you must stay 
away.:zuv 
As a result of continued fighting, there was an approximate three week delay between 
the signing of the airport agreement and its re-op!!ning for humanitarian purposes.210 
Whether this fighting was directly attributable to the irate Serbian soldier and his troops 
is not exactly known but there can be no doubt that they were somehow involved in the 
fighting. 
Another example illustrating this problem is the breakaway Muslim faction 
operating in Bosnia. On June 29, 1994, a Japanese weekly reported that there were at 
least 1,000 mujahedin (Muslim fighters) in Bosnia who were not under any effective 
government control. One of the mujahedin was quoted as saying that "we fight for Islam 
and are not interested in peace. ''2" Fikret Abdic, a breakaway Muslim leader in Bihac, 
leads another armed group that has created problems for the peacekeepers. 212 Besides 
the mujahedin and Fikret Abdic there are probably a number of other small armed groups 
in Bosnia that have created serious difficulties for the peacekeepers. Unfortunately, 
about the only way that UNPROFOR can deal with this dilemma is by trying to 
effectively work around these groups. 
UNPROFOR has confronted a multitude of problems in carrying out its mandate 
which is not an uncommon experience for a peacekeeping mission. Indeed, all operations 
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have experienced some problems with their mandate but UNPROFOR clearly has had 
more than its fair share. Lack of cooperation, armed groups outside of effective political 
control, and misinterpretation of its mandate have been the major barriers that 
UNPROFOR has and still is confronted with in trying to carry out its mandated tasks. 
But while these problems have made the peacekeeper's already difficult mandate even 
more difficult, none of them have effectively threatened the disbandment of 
UNPROFOR. 
POLITICAL SUPPORT 
The failure of the international community to commit support for decisive peace-
enforcement in Bosnia has received considerable scholarly attention.213 The provision 
of actual support to UNPROFOR's more limited but still taxing tasks has attracted less 
attention. The topic deserves examination because the political context of a peacekeeping 
operation has a strong effect on its degree of success. Peacekeeping operations require 
the support of the international community and the local parties involved in the conflict. 
In the Bosnian case, the two aspects of political support, international and local, are at 
opposing ends of the spectrum with the former being somewhat supportive and the latter 
not so supportive. Perha·,Js the biggest factor working in favour of UNPROFOR has 
been the support of the international community, especially the Great Powers, towards 
the resolutions est.\blishing U:NPROFOR's mandate. The support of the permanent 
members of the Security Council for humanitarian assistance is reflected in the fact that 
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all members, expect China, voted in favour of each of the major resolutions on Bosnia. 
China abstained in votes on resolutions 770, 776, 781, 816214 (Note Table 2 - Security 
Council Vote on Bosnian Resolutions). It should be noted that while the permanent 
Security Council members voted in ta11our of all the major resolutions, not all of them 
have been willing to provide UNPROFOR with the needed tangible resources to carry 
out its duties. This will be discussed further below. 
International Support 
If any of the permanent members of the Security Council oppose an operation, 
then it will never get past the planning stages because they can block its implementation 
by using their veto power. The United States and Russia are the permanent members 
who are the key players in the development and deployment of UN peacekeeping 
operations. American support is especially critical to anyone proposing the organization 
of a UN peacekeeping operation. The Nicaraguan request for UN observers to monitor 
the Contra rebels and the French request for UN peacekeepers to supervise the 
withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut in 1982 never got 
past the planning stages because these proposed operations lacked the support of the 
United States.215 Even after an operation is deployed, the continued support of the 
Great Powers, especially the U.S., is needed if the mission is to succeed. With the end 
of the Cold War, Great Power support for peacekeeping has been altered in two ways: 
firstly, i~ has been easier to achieve as the U.S. and Russia, at least temporarily, began 
62 
to cooperate and pursue similar foreign policy objectives; and, secondly, with the demise 
of the Soviet Union, the importance of U.S. support for successful peacekeeping has 
increased. 
United State~16 
When UNPROFOR was first deployed the Bush Administration supported its 
creation and deployment but avoided any major U.S. involvement because, as mentioned 
before, it did not want to get involved in another Lebanon. However, as the 
humanitarian situation deteriorated and pressure grew from the Islamic world to help the 
Muslims, the U.S. started to move towards a more active Bosnian approach.217 When 
the Clinton administration took office in early 1993, its Bosnian policy was basically the 
same as its predecessor's but with a little more active involvement in the crisis. Under 
Clinton, U.S. activities in the support of UNPROFOR in Bosnia have included: flying 
humanitarian sorties into the Sarajevo airport, an activity which was begun by the Bush 
Administration; initiating a humanitarian air drop in February 1993; helping to enforce 
the no-fly zone since March 31, 1993; and, in conjunction with NATO, providing 
protection to UNPROFOR peacekeepers in support of its mandate. In addition, the U.S. 
has supported and continues to support the longest humanitarian airlift in history, flying 
approximately one third of the missions. In November 1993, the Amer~cans offered to 
double their number of flights into Sarajevo airport (as of April 1994 the U.S. has flown 
the largest number of humanitarian sorties into the airport). The U.S. is also th,~ largest 
single donor of humanitarian aid contributing more than 370 million since 1991, and it 
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has participated in over 80% of the airdrops that have brought in 10 million meals since 
February 1993.218 
All of these contributions have helped UNPROFOR with its mandate, but the one 
area where the U.S. h~ls the potential to make its biggest contribution is where it has 
failed to act. Since the deployment of UNPROFOR ir. June 1992 the U.S. has, and 
continues, to refuse to commit any ground troops to the UN operation in Bosnia. In 
discussing American ground troop involvement in Bosnia, Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher stated: 
If we are satisfied with the conditions for our participation, we would be prepared to 
participate in a NATO implementation of a Bosnian sett!ement. Those conditions would 
include good-faith agreement to a settlement by all the parities and evidence of good faith 
implementation.219 
Thus far American participation in the Bosnian case has been helpful principally with 
respect to logistical and humanitarian support. Despite the lack of American troops in 
UNPROFOR, the U.S. has supported the operation in other important areas. 
When UNPROFOR was initially deployed in June 1992, Russian Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, on a visit to Washington, expressed Russia's support for the 
peacekeeping operation. 221 Unlike the United States, Russia has taken its support for 
UNPROFOR one step farther. Besides pledging its moral support, the Russian 
Federation has offered some of its troops to UNPROFOR. On February 17, 1994, 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin offered to send Russian troops stationed in Croatia to 
Sarajevo to assist in the supervision and withdrawal of Serbian heavy weapons from the 
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exclusion zones. The United Nations quickly accepted this offer and 400 troops were 
deployed in Sarajevo on February 21, 1994.222 The Serbs were under a deadline in 
early February 1994 to remove their heavy weapons from the exclusion zones or face the 
possibility of NATO air strikes.223 Russia's polic} towards the Bosnia crisis from the 
very beginning had a pro-Serb component opposing any Western military action. 224 
It is quite possible, and highly likely, that by deploying its troops, Russia's true aim was 
not t·1 help the UNPROFOR cause but rather the Serbian cause. But whatever its 
ultimate reasons were for offering its troops, they were no doubt a welcome addition to 
an inadequately manned force. 
When the Yugoslav crisis began, Russia's foreign policy was initially tom 
between two contending sides. On the one hand, there was the powerful pro-Serbian 
communist and nationalist opposition at home, and, on the other hand, there was a group 
favouring good relations with the Western powers who were, more often than not, 
antagonistic towards the Serbs.215 The West, more particularly the United States, 
realized that any unilateral actions in Yugoslavia, such as military intervention, could 
strengthen the pro-Serbian nationalist opposition and thereby threaten the democratic 
liberal reforms of Yeltsin's government. By mid April 1993 the AmeriC311 l~.adership 
had come to accept the twin proposition not only that Yeltsin required signific1111t politicaliUld 
economic help from abroad but that the United States should be cautious in preuing the 
Yellsin administration into actions or policies·aucb as military intervention in Yugoalavia-tbat 
risked giving fuel to his opponents in the Supreme Soviet 1111d the Congreu of People'11 
Deputies.226 
This new policy was evident during the Security Council's meeting dealing with the 
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imposition of harsher sanction~ against Serbia in mid-April 1993. The meeting was to 
take place just before a critical referendum on Yeltsin's government but due to Russian 
objections the meeting was postponed until after the referendum. After Yeltsin scored 
a decisive victory in the referendum, the Russian Federation declared its support for 
tighter economic sanctior,s. 227 
Since the middle of 1992, Russia's initially inconsistent policy towards the 
Yugoslav crisis has become more consistent and its policy towards the war in Bosnia can 
be summed up as follows: 
I the Russians! oppose military intervention, they reject what they consider the West's unjust 
and excessive blaming of Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs for the continuation of the Bosnia 
war, they oppose the lifting of tht: anna embargo against Bosnia, and they advocate halting 
SIUlctions against Serbia as soon as possible. :zzt 
Despite the fact that Russia has taken a pro-Serb slant towards the crisis in Bosnia, its 
policies have been working in support of rather than at cross purposes with 
UNPROFOR. 229 Whatever future efforts are going to be deployed in Bosniat whether 
they take the form of continued peacekeeping, or involve peace-enforcement or military 
interventiont there is no doubt that Russian policy will be crucial to the success of any 
future plans for Bosnia. 
European Community (£C)/European Union (EU) 
At an Economic Summit in July 1992 the EC stated that "[w]e welcome the 
efforts made in achieving the opening of the airport of Sarajevo; and we support actions 
taken by UNPROFOR [U.N. Protective Force] to secure the airport. "230 Not only did 
the EC/EU support the initial actions of UNPROFOR in opening the airport but it has 
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also been supportive of other duties assigned to the operation. For example, regarding 
the idea of using force to deliver aid, President Mitterand of France said that "Italy, 
backed by France, believes in the use of force, at least sufficient to guarantee the security 
of deliveries of humanitarian aid" while British Prime Minister John Major stated that 
Britain supported the move being aware of the "very grave difficulties there are in 
proceeding without a cease-fire. "231 
While the EC/EU has been working in support of the United Nations so to have 
some of its individual members. Britain and France have been two members of the 
EC/EU that have pledged the strongest support for UNPROFOR as both countries have 
sizeable contingents in the operation.232 They have also been willing to back up some 
of the Security Council resolutions with action. When resolution 770 was passed asking 
member states to take "nationally or through regional agencies all necessary measures" 
to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, Britain and France, along with Canada and 
Spain, agreed to provide troops to the expanded UN operation.233 Besides taking part 
in the delivery of aid by land, France and Britain are also heavily involved in the 
Sarajevo airlift as they rank second and third, respectively, behind the United States in 
the number of relief flights into the Sarajevo airport. 234 
Besides Britain and France, another important European actor in the Bosnian 
crisis has been Germany. Even though the German military is now permitted to 
participate in UN peacekeeping operations, as a result of a Supreme Court ruling in July 
1994,235 Germany has still not deployed any ground troops to Yugoslavia, and, due to 
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historical reasons, it is highly unlikely this will happen. However, despite the fact that 
it has no ground troops in Bosnia, Germany has still been working in support of 
UNPROFOR as its soldiers have been taking part in NATO surveillance missions 
enforcing the ban on military flights.236 In April 1993, a German court ruled five to 
three in favour of allowing German soldiers to remain on NATO surveillance planes 
enforcing the ban on mil1tary flights. In July 1994, the German parharnent gave its 
approval, retrospectively, to allow members of the German air force to fly on NATO 
aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Germany was also one of the first 
countries to request that a United Nations peacekeeping operation be deployed in 
Bosnia.237 
When the crisis began in Bosnia the EC and the United Nations applied the 
"division of labour" approach used in Croatia, "the UN took responsibility for 
negotiating and monitoring cease-fires, while the EC led the effort to find a political 
solution to the crisis. "238 The "division of labour approach" sounded good in theory 
but it was difficult to sustain and the dual approach was short lived. The dual approach 
came to a head in July 199~: when Lord Carrington, chief negotiat0r for the EC, 
mediated a cease-fire that required Bosnian Serb forces to put their heavy weapons under 
the supervision of UN forces. This plan did not go over well with Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali as he criticized the EC for committing UN forces without first 
consulting with the United Nations. As a result of this incident, the EC and the UN 
merged their efforts and the UN became involved in the political negotiations. 2311 The 
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UN has since taken the lead in all aspects of the Bosnian crisis with the EC playing a 
supporting role. This is not to say a fully effective partnership was formed. Continued 
tension between EC policy and UN Security Council policy, shaped by American 
influence, has hampered the overall international effort to restore peace to Bosnia. 
North Atlantic Treaty OrganizatWn (NATO) 
Despite tensions between its leading members' policies towards Bosnia, NATO 
has responded positively to every call for support made by the United Nations both in 
Bosnia and in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. For example, besides supporting 
UN efforts in Bosnia, NATO forces, acting under resoh1tions 713, 757, 787 and 820, are 
also in th~ Adriatic helping to enforce the UN imposed embargo against Serbia. The 
NATO contributions to the international efforts in Bosnia and other parts of the former 
Yugoslavia are also unique as it is the first time in history that the regional alliance has 
directly supported the United Nations.m NATO has made several invaluable 
contributions to UNPROFOR:241 
-the alliance has contributed personnel and equipment. In fact, NATO countries have 
made the largest single contribution to all three UNPROFOR operations in Yugoslavia, 
constituting approximately three quarters of the personnel. Even though UNPROFOR 
consists of mainly NATO troops the operation is still under the command of the UN. 
-NATO Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (A WACS) have been monitoring 
the ban on military flights since October 1992, and since April 1993, over 100 NATO 
airplanes have been enforcing the no-fly zone. On February 28, 1994, NATO warplanes 
shot down four Serbian military aircraft who were in violation of the no-fly zone. 
-NATO, acting under resolution 836, has also been providing protective air power to 
UNPROFOR in case of attack. On April 10 and 11, 1994, NATO warplanes attacked 
areas in Gorazde in response to UNPROFOR requests to provide air protection for its 
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force. 
-NATO has also been responsible for carrying out air suikes, on request and in 
coordination with the UN, against designated targets that threaten the declared safe-areas 
of Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Bihac, Gorazde, and Zepa. NATO's tripartite duties of 
enforcing the no-fly zone and providing air protection to UNPROFOR and the safe areas 
has been codenamed "Operation Deny Flight" (Note Table 3 - Chronology of NATO 
Involvement in Bosnia). 
The NATO-UN association has proven to be successful but the working 
relationship has not been without some problems. Whenever two organizations with their 
own political and military decision making bureaus decide to work together, it is only 
natural that command and control problems will emerge. Such is the case with this 
relationship. Although there are ccmmand and control problems in the Bosnian operation 
there is no doubt that the UN is the ultimate legal and political decision makiJl~ 
authority. 242 The UN has delegated authority to NATO to carry out the enforcement 
of the no-fly zone but they have not delegated the same authority with respect to ground 
strikes. In order to carry out ground strikes NATO commanders must first seek UN 
approval.243 There have been some minor difficulties with the NATO-UN relationship, 
but the negative aspects have been far outweighed by the positive contributions that 
NATO has made in its association with the UN and UNPROFOR.244 
Local Support 
Besides international backing, the support of the immediate parties to a war is also 
a very critical ingredient for successful peacekeeping. With post-Cold War peacekeeping 
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operations increasingly focused on internal conflicts involving a number of local parties, 
they are confronted with th~ tiUestion as to how many of the local parties need to give 
their support to the operation? For example, if there are four factions involved in a 
conflict, what degree of local support is needed? Is the support of two or three parties 
sufficient or should support be achieved from all of the parties? Does the operation have 
a chance of succeeding if lmly two or three of the parties support the operation? The 
answers to these questions would probably depend on the mandate of the peacekeeping 
operation and the distribution of military contributions. 
Besides the above mentioned dilemma, there is also the problem of initial support. 
In some operations, particularly those involving internal conflicts, the parties at the outset 
may support the operation, but for some reason or another, one, two, or all of the 
parties, after a period of time, may oppose ~he presence of the UN mission. If some or 
all of the local parties change their policy should the operation pull out or continue with 
its mandate? Again, the answers would most likely depend on the mandate. Another 
important factor regarding local support is impartiality. When a UN operation appears 
to favour one side over another then local support will, more than likely, falter and the 
mission will experience difficulties. However, faltering support from tt.e local parties 
does not necessarily spell the end of an operation but it usually does make a 
peacekeeper's job more difficult. 
The support and cooperation of the l<Y'..al parties with UNPROFOR can be best 
summed up as inconsistent, shaky and limited. With respect to the delivery of aid, the 
71 
local parties have at times allowed the passage of aid convoys while at other times they 
have been repeatedly denied access to the needed areas. While the media coverage seems 
to imply that the Serbs are the only ones obstructing the humanitarian convoys, the 
Croats and Muslims are also guilty of frequently blocking and impeding the aid 
convoys. 245 The local parties have frequently signed agreements allowing for the 
unhindered passage of humanitarian assistance, but these agreements are not worth the 
paper they are written on since individual warlords or soldiers have continued to impede 
the delivery of aid convoys for military and political reasons. The Serbs have frequently 
prevented convoys from reaching Muslim and Croatian enclaves while the Muslims and 
Croatians have done the same to Serbian towns and villages. The Muslims have also 
been guilty of blocking aid to Croatian communities and vice versa. The aim of using 
starvation tactics by each of the local parties is to weaken the other's sides population, 
in the hopes of increasing their chances of winning the war. 246 
The UN forces in Bosnia have been autr.orized to use "all necessary means" to 
achieve their me ndate but they have never once fought a battle with any of the local 
factions to get aid through. UNPROFOR has been reluctant to force aid through because 
it fears that its impartiality would be lost and it would be seen as favouring one side over 
the others. However, as Mihailo Cmobmja points out, even without using force, 
UNPROFOR personnel have, more often than not, been treated as the enemy: 
they have been accused of taking sides; their vehicles have been stolen; they have been shot 
at, wounded, and even killed. On a few occasions the warring sides have masqueraded as 
UN peace-keepers, driving around in white vehicles wilh UN flags and opening fire on their 
opponents in order to dmw fire against the UN troops.'l47 
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UNPROFOR has also been accused of taking part in ethnic cleansing when it evacuated 
residents, mainly children, the elderly and the sick and wounded, from Bosnian towns 
and ccmmunities that wert: under siege. 248 In response to these accusations, 
UNPROFOR then prevented large scale movements of people from ,·arious cities and 
towns with the aim of keeping the territories' ethnic composition intact bUl the 
peacekeepers were then accused of taking part in the Serbian strangulation of these 
regions. 249 
From its initial deployment in June 1992 up until December 1994 the cooperation 
from local parties with UNPROFOR has been very limited and shaky. Indeed, the single 
biggest problem confronting UNPROFOR has been the lack of consistent C'JOpcration 
from the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The failure of the warring parties to negotiate a 
settlement with one another and to facilitate a peace implementatior. and monitoring role 
for UNPROFOR has circumscribed severely the mission's operations. Achievement of 
territorial gains and war aims has interested the Serb, Croat, and Muslim leaders more 
than cooperation with UNPROFOR. 
·. 
PAYING FOR UNPROFOR 
Funding can affect the success of a peacekeeping operation in several ways.250 
First, as a result of a lack of funds, a peacekeeping operation may have to be cut short 
uefore the mandate has been achieved or before the situation has been stabilized. 
Second, the number of peacekeepers authorized to carry out the mandate may have to be 
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limited because of the lack of funds. Finally, a peacekeeping force may have to do 
without important equipment that is needed to effectively carry out its duties. Funding 
appears to be a minor determinant of successful peacekr~ping because every UN 
peacekeeping mission has been inadequately funded yet some have still achieved their 
mandate. 251 Although inadequate funding is a thorn in the side of a peacekeeping 
operation, to date no mission has been discontinued due to an insufficiency of funds. 
Peacekeeping always has been plagued by financial problems, and with the 
increase in the number of peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War, the 
costs have dramatically increased.252 In 1989, 638 million dollars was spent on 
peacekeeping; in 1990 417 million; in 1991 559 million; and in 1992 nearly two billion 
was spent. As of April 30, 1994, the annual cost of the UN's current operations had 
risen to about 3.8 billion dollars.253 Peacekeeping operations are financed by two 
methods. Smaller missions, such as observ~r and survey missions, good offices, and 
peacemaking activities are paid out of the regular budget of the United Nations. The rest 
of the missions, except the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 
which is paid for by voluntary contributions from a select number of member-states, are 
paid for by a Special Account which is based on the assessment scale of the regular UN 
budget. Peacekeeping operations financed by Special Accounts have heen the customary 
practice of the UN ever since the deployment of the second United Nations Emergency 
Force (UNEF II) in 1973.254 
The Special Account for financing peacekeeping operations divides member states 
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into four categories. 255 The first groul! of member-states are the permanent members 
of the Security Council and their peacekeeping assessment is about 22% more th~n their 
regular budget assessment. 256 The second group of member-states cousists of 
rJe·1eloped industrial states such as Canada, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Italy, 
Japan, and Iceland and their ;:-eacekeeping assessment is the same as their regular budget 
assessment. The third category consists of wealthier developing states such as Argentina, 
Israel, and Saudi Arabia which pay one fifth of their regular budget assessment while the 
fourth group, which consists of poorer developing countries such as Afghanistan, 
Lebanon, Mozambique, Nepal, and Yemen, pay one tenth of their regular budget 
assessment for peacekeeping operation~ •. 257 
Despit~ the fact that all UN member~ are assessed fees for peacekeeping many 
are reluctant to pay their share or lag behind in their payments. The result has been an 
outstanding balance for peacekeeping operations that stood at 2.4 billion as of August 31, 
1994.258 A frequer.t complaint of many UN member-states is that peacekeeping is too 
expensive. However, when pP..acekeeping expenditures are compared to military 
expenditures it becomes evident that the former is a bargain. For example, the UN 
peacek~ping budget for 1989 (638 million) was "less than the annual operating cost of 
a single US Army division that is not engaged in battle. "259 Many other examples 
could be listed, but the point is that states are prepared to spend hundreds of billions of 
dollars on military equipment a...d supplies but they are not prepared to spend a very 
small fraction of that for peacekeeping operations. Indeed, peacekeeping does cost 
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mon~y, but as William Durch points out, it "remains cheap when compared to the cost 
of modem militaries. "260 
The financial arrangements of UNPROFOR are both unique and innovative as no 
other peacekeeping operation has had a simi1ar funding scheme. 261 The only other 
operation that somewhat resembles UNPROFOR's financial arrangements is UNFICYP 
in Cyprus. UNPROFOR is paid for by two methods: its monitoring tasks are paid for 
by all UN members through the peacekeeping as::essment scale while the states providing 
troops for humru:itarian activities, which include convoy escort and protection duties, 
have borne this expense themselves. 262 
One would think that the UN would be hapry that a large portion of 
UNPROFOR's bill was being paid for by voluntary contributions. Initially, it was happy 
to be receiving voluntary contributions until the funding scheme led to some unforseen 
problems. Some countries objected that this type of financial arrangement would lead 
to a situation where peacekeeping OJX~rations would be only established in regions that 
could afford them and be staffed only by countries which could afford the costs of 
participation. 263 Besides these objectiom· the Secretary-General has pointed out that the 
financial arrangements have also worked against the integration of the reo;pective units 
into an effective TJN force. In his November 1992 report, the Secretary-General 
indicated that 
(t)he addition to UNPROFOR of contingents financed and supported entirely by their national 
governments has given rise to some teething troubles, especially as regards command and 
control. I have had to seek the help of the contributing governments in ensuring that all 
concerned recognize that the new units are an inlegral part of UNPROFOR, under the overall 
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command of the Force Commander, and that newly arrived troopA wearing United Nations 
insignia puss under United Nations commund as soon as they reach the mi1111ion area.l64 
Other problems that have stemmed from this arrangement have been the reluctance of 
contributing states to adeqJately pay their forces under the command of the UN and to 
make sure that their troops fully comply with the legal, operational, and arlministrative 
policies of UNPROFOR. 265 The arrangements have also set an undesirable precedent 
by letting wealthier states such as the U.S., Japan, and Germany off the financial hook. 
I 
As a result of these problems, th\! Secretary-Gener .. : has recommended that all activities 
of UNPROFOR be financed through the regular manner of the peacekeeping assessment 
scale which is levied on all member-states. 266 
While the funding scheme itself has lead to some problems so has the lack of 
finances which has had its biggest effect on troop deployment. Several times the UN has 
appealed for more troops to protect the safe areas, monitor cease-fires, ~.nd perform other 
duties but more often than not these requests have fallen on deaf ears. 267 Besides an 
insufficient number of troops, UNPROFOR has had to deal with other financially related 
problems such as a lack of adequate equipmt~nt and supplies. 268 But despite these 
financial problems, UNPROFOR, just like every other _..eacekeeping operation, has had 
to learn to do its best with the limited resources at its disposal. 
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Operational aspects of a peacekeeping operation include the command, control, 
logistics, and coordination of a peacekeeping mission. The size and composition of the 
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force are also important in this regard. While peacekeeping operations are usually 
established by the Security Council and come under its authority, it is the Secretary-
General who is responsible for their organization, planning, implementation, and 
control.269 To help with these functions the Secretary-General is assisted by the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which was formerly known as the 
Office of Special Political Affairs.270 
Commllnd-Control and Field Operations 
All peacekeeping operations are under the control of the United Nations in New 
York with the Secretary-General being at the top of the chain of command. The 
command of field operations is under the control of a Force Commander who is 
appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Security Council.271 The 
Force Commander has full control over the operation, except for disciplinary matters, 
and is responsible to the Secretary General. The Field Operations Division (FOD) is 
another important branch of a peacekeeping operation. Besides looking after the civilian 
component of the operation, the FOD commander, along with the civilian Chief 
Administrative Officer, is responsible for providing and maintaining a wide range of 
logistical support for both the mission and its staff. 272 
Operational problems can affect the success of a peacekeeping o~ration in several 
ways. Even though all peacekeeping operations are under the command of the United 
Nations in New York, it is well known that its control is at times very weak. Another 
line of command problem deals with the national oontingents. While the peacekeepers 
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are under the control of a commander, who is in tum under the control of the UN in 
New York, many of the national contingents still report back to their home governments 
especially in dangerous situations. At such moments, "governments are not averse to 
second-guessing UN field commanders if contingents phone home to clear orders, a 
process that can complicate operations and even increase the level of danger posed to 
troops in the fi~ld. "273 
Other possible operational matters that might affect the success of a peacekeeping 
operation are the Field Commander, the integration of the numerous national detachments 
into one, and obtaining the proper equipment and training. The Secretary-General 
usually asks a member country to provide a Field Commander and the Executive Office 
of the Secretary-General accepts whomever the member-country appoints. With this type 
of procedure the best Field Commander is not necessarily chosen for the assignment. 
Integration of the various national detachments into a competent mission under the sole 
command of the UN may also present a problem to a peacekeeping operation as its 
efficiency can be hampered by such impediments as linguistic and cultural differences. 
Delays in both training new person.nel about what is expected of them and obtaining the 
proper equipment can stall the start date of an operation and hamper its effectiveness. 774 
The majority of peacekeeping missions are confronted with some operational problems 
but they cannot be viewed as a major determinant of a mission's overall success. Like 
the funding crisis, operational problems can be regarded as a thorn in the side of a 
peacekeeping mission; their effect on the mission's efficiency can be great while their 
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effect on the mission's overall success is usua.Uy limited.m 
The mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia grew out of the mandate of the original 
UN operation in Croatia. As mentioned previously, although the mandate of 
UNPROFOR originally was related only to Croatia it was envisioned that 100 military 
observers would be sent to areas of Bosnia after the demilitarization of the UNPA •s.276 
However. as a result of deteriorating condition in Bosnia, the mandate of UNPROFOR 
in Croatia was extended to include an additional 1,100 troops to secure the functioning 
of the Sarajevo airport and supervise the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the 
area.m While these troops were authorized for deployment on June 8, 1992 
(Resolution 758), their deployment, as a result of intensive fighting, was delayed until 
June 29, 1992. When the first troops were deployed to Bosnia, they remained a part of 
UNPROFOR in Croatia until a new Bosnia-Herzegovina command (BHC) was 
established in Kiseljak (20 kilometres north-west of Sarajevo) to carry out the task of 
escorting and protecting humanitarian aid convoys.278 
Following the adoption of resolution 871 on October 4, 1993, the military 
structure of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia was reorganized under three 
subordinate commands: UNPROFOR Croatia, headquartered in Zagreb and led by 
Major-General A. Tayyeb of Jordan; UNPROFOR Bosnia, headquartered in K.iseljak and 
led by Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose of the United Kingdom; and UNPROFOR 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, headquartered in Skopje and led by Brigadier-
General Tryggve Tellefsen of Norway. The three commanders report to the Force 
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Commander, Lieutenant-General Bertrand de Lapresle of France who, with the civilian, 
administrative, and logistical components of the operation, acts under the direction of the 
Secretary-General's Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi of Japan.279 
Siz.e and Composition of Force 
The size of UNPROFOR grew as its mandate expanded. Its initial size was 
1,100 troops. As of November 4, 1994, UNPROFOR consisted of 21,865 military and 
civilian personnel from twenty countries.280 Over half the force is drawn from 
Bangladesh, France, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and 
the U.K. (Note Table 4- UNPROFOR Personnel Strength). 
Command, Communications, and Logistics 
The separate Bosnian command established by resolution 871 is responsible for 
all peacekeeping activities within the former Yugoslavian republic, but as mentioned 
previously, the overall command and control of UNPROFOR in Bosnia is still exercised 
by the Force Commander.281 Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose, who assumed his 
duties in February 1994, is the fourth commander of the Bosnian operation. Other 
Bosnian commanders have included, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie of Canada (March 
1992 to July 1992), Lieutenant-General Phillipe Morillon of France (August 1992 to June 
1993) and Lieutenant-General Francis Briquemont of Belgium (June 1993 to January 
1994). Commander changes have been so frequent that the image of a revolving door 
command comes to mind. The problems arising from this situation have been mitigated 
due to the positive abilities and character of the individual Commanders. 
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A serious problem confronting UNPROFOR's command structure is whether its 
chain of command is able to effectively protect the peacekeepers. By the time a request 
from the peacekeepers travels through the chain of command it could be too late to 
proceed with an effective response to the request. The inefficiency of this chain of 
command was highlighted last March when French peacekeepers came under fire from 
Serbian forces near Bihac in northwestern Bosnia. 282 When the French troops 
determined that they were being shot at by Serbian tanks they began to return fire and 
requested protective air strikes. However, by the time the request had moved through 
the chain of command, the Serbs had slipped away and it was too late to take any 
action. 2113 The chronology of the French requl:st can be summarized as follows. At 
around 7:00 p.m. on Saturday March 12, 1994, French troops came under fire and 
requested air protection. Lieutenant~General Michael Rose relayed the request to the 
UNPROFOR Force Commander but the request did not reach General Jean Cot's 
command, UNPROFOR Force Commander at the time, until 8:30p.m. Officials claim 
that it took a while to track him down to relay the request to him. At 10:35 p.m., 
General Cot decided that air strikes were needed and he transferred the request to 
Yasushi Akashi who has the final authorization on the use of air power. Mr. Akashi 
called a meeting to determine whether air strikes were needed and in then; .- ~~ i ~ ";c, ·s 
the request moved up the chain of command, the French troops were still being fired 
upon. Finally, at 11:39 p.m., Mr. Akashi authorized the air strikes but it was too late 
as ti•e French soldiers were unable to locate the Serbian gunners. At 1:45 a.m., the 
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mission was cancelled as the Serbian forces managed to escape. 2114 
Fortunately, this incident did not result in any casualties for the French troops, 
but it highlighted the inefficiency of UNPROFOR 's command structure. Several military 
officials concluded that the Serbian gunners could have been destroyed if air strikes had 
been authorized quicker but "by the time the pilots received authorization, the targets had 
moved off. "285 General Jean-Pierre Cot, former Force Commander of UN 
peacekeepers in ex-Yugoslavia, has said that three hours is an unacceptable period of 
time to have a request for air support authorized. In serious incidents such as the one 
above, he said a response time of three minutes would be perfect while a half an hour 
would be nice.286 
The time it takes to act on a request can be reduced by creating a ~maller chain 
of command for UNPROFOR and this can be accomplished in either one of two ways. 
The first and most effective scenario would be implementing General Cot's proposal of 
delegating full responsibility for air strikes to the UN military commanders rather than 
to the Secretary-General's Special Representative. General Cot has demanded the right 
of UN commanders to be able to call in air strikes when their troops are in danger. In 
early 1994, he wrote an article in the l...e .Wonde and sent messages to Boutros Boutros-
Ghali demanding that UN commanders be given this authority.m As a result of his 
actions, Boutros Boutros-Ghali demanded Cot's resignation and he was later replaced by 
another French commander, Lieutenant-General Bertr-.utd de Lapresle, in March 
1994.288 
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General Cot's proposal does not make it clear whether authority should be 
dr.legated to the Force Commandtr of UNPROFOR or to the UN commander in Bosnia. 
The latter would seem to be the most effective option as the UNPROFOR Commander 
and his peacekeepers are the ones on the ground in Bosnia and they know the situation 
better than the Force Commander in Zagreb, Croatia, or the politicians in New York. 
They know first hand what the situation is and how to adequately respond to any crisis 
that may arise. But full delegation of a UN peacekeeping operation to military officials 
has yet to happen and it does not seem likely in the near future. Therefore, the next best 
option would be to eliminate the middle man in the command chain. In this case that 
would be the Force Commander of UNPROFOR.289 By having an overall Force 
Commander, this only arids another unnecessary step in the bureaucratic ladder of 
UNPROFOR as there is no need for the Bosnian Commander to first consull the Force 
Commander. While not perfect, either of these options would somewhat reduce the 
bureaucracy of UNPROFOR and pos~ibly lead to a more efficient and effective chain of 
commano. 
Besides the structure of UNPROFOR's command and control the operation has 
also been confronted with some communication problems that are common to all UN 
peacekeeping operations. Problems of multiple languages, procedures, and equipment, 
which all have been intensified by a lack of common training, have been present in 
UNPROFOR. 290 And while these problems have not been a major hindrance to 
UNPROFOR, they have presented frequent minor difficulties for the operation's military 
84 
and civilian personnel. These problems have had a greater effect on the efficiency of 
TJNPROFOR r.tthr.r than its overall success. 291 UNPROFOR, as have the vast majority 
of other UN operations, also suffers from a lack of communication between the ground 
troops in Bosnia and the politicians ~t the UN headquarters in New York. One of the 
biggest critics of the lack of communication betwl!en the military and political arms of 
UNPROFOR has been Major-General Lewis MacKenzie. In discussing his tour of duty 
as the Bosnian commander MacKem:ie said, 
Do not get in trouble as a .:ommander in the field after five o'clock New York time or on 
Saturday <ir Sunday; there is no one to answer the phone. It is a nine-to-five civilian 
operatiCJn run out of the office.292 
MacKenzie also complained that the civilian logistic support personnel he was promised 
never arrived in Bosnia because they all volunteered to go to Cambodia where the per 
diem payments were higher. 293 These communication and command problems, which 
by no means are unique to UNPROFOR, stress the need for the establishment of both 
a training center for peacekeepers and for a 24 hour command headquarters in New 
York.294 Neither would effectively guarantee success but they would definitely 
alleviate the problems somewhat and improve the efficiency of UNPROFOR and other 
UN peacekeeping operations. 29s 
NATURE OF mE CONFLICT 
The type of conflict in which a peacekeeping operation is placed can have an 
effect on its feasibility and success. Some conflicts seem to be more suited to 
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peacekeeping than others and the consensus seems to point towards peacekeeping 
experiencing greater success in inter-state disputes rather than intra-state disputes. There 
are sevr.ral reasons for the differing succ.ess rates.296 
Firstly, in inter-state conflicts there are usually, on average, only two parties 
involved whereas intra-state disputes typically involve more than two identifiable actors. 
The higher the number of players the more difficult it is to adequately satisfy them all. 
Pc.ul Diehl, in hin study of UNIFIL in Lebanon, points out that in this civil conflict there 
are more than a half dozen political factions, each with their own military force. Besides 
these factions, there are other actors in the Lebanon drama such as the PLO, Syria, 
Israel, and various terrorist groups. 297 Achieving a political settlement that satisfies all 
of these parties has proven to be a difficult task for the United Nations. UNTAC in 
Cambodia is another example that shows the difficulties peacekeepers face in civil 
conflicts. Satisfying all four parties in that conflict, especially the Khmer Rouge faction, 
proved to be a difficult task for UN peacekeepers. 298 
Secondly, in internal disputes, the conflicting parties usually operate in separate 
regions of the affected countries requiring the peacekeepers to cover more territory which 
opens up the possibility of more skirmishes. Also, with civil conflicts it is more difficult 
to draw a cease-fire line or a buffer :wne to keep the warring factions apart; "unlike an 
identifiable international border or cease-fire line, it may be impossible to demarcate a 
line or area that separates the many sides in the conflict. "299 
Thirdly, a peacekeeping operation always seems to favour the status quo at the 
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time of deployment. A cease-fire usually favours the current government and some of the 
warring factions may object to a cease-fire because it will continue the oppression they 
are fightin.g to overthrow. 300 
While peacekrcping appears to have more success i!l inter-state disputes than in 
intra-state disputes this does not imply that intra-state peacekeeping must necessarily fail. 
There have been several successful internal operations such as UNTAG, UNAMIC, 
UNTAC, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), and the 
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).301 Rather, the argument is that 
peacekeeping missions in inter-state conflicts are presented with better conditions for 
success. 
It has bt>.en almost three years since the war began in Bosnia and the debate 
remains as to the type of conflict? Is it an internal or international conflict? Even the 
parties within Bosnia disagree over how to classify the conflict. Bosnian President 
Izetbegovic says that the conflict is not a civil war but rather an act of aggression of one 
state against another. However, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, 
contends that it is a civil war since the Serbs are pursuing their own rights within 
Bosnia. 302 Both have legitimate claims but neither Izetbegovic nor Karadzic are totally 
correct because the conflict has elements ot:hoth an internal and international war. It is 
an internal conflict because the citizens within Bosnia are fighting each other and it is an 
international conflict because other states, Serbia and Croatia, have been involved in the 
fighting. 
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Despite the fact that Bosnia has been an independent state since May 22, 1992 and 
all of the fighting has taken place within its own borders, the war can still not be 
considered as entirely internal. Both Croatia and Serbia invaded Bosnia to carve out 
their own piece of territory and while both states have since officially withdrawn their 
forces there is no doubt that both are still involved in the conflict.303 The Bosnian war, 
a complicated mix of internal and international conflicts, is by far one of the most 
difficult situations that UN peacekeepers have been placed in to date. Even the most 
internationally supported, adequately equipped, and financially backed UN operation with 
the clearest and most realisti: mandate would run into problems in Bosnia. 
ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
UNPROFOR faces a host of problems: it is financially strapped. inadequately 
equipped, IJ.cks a sufficient number of troops, is deployed in the middle of a complex 
conflict, has command and control problems, and most importantly it lacks consistent 
cooperation from the local parties. About the only thing that UNPROFOR has working 
in its favour is the support of the international community. With all these difficulties and 
frustrations can UNPROFOR be considered a success? Since the operation is still under 
way it is difficult to draw final conclusions on whether it has been a success or failur~. 
However, the operation can be rated on its performance in carrying out its mandate to 
date. As of December 1994, UNPROFOR has experienced mixed results with respect 
to its ca.ssigned duties (Note Table 5 -Planned UNPROFOR Action Versus Results). 
88 
The major failure of UNPROFOR's mandate has been in the protection of the safe 
areas. Resolutions 819 and 824 declared six regions (Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, 
Zepa, Tuzla, Bihac) in Bosnia as "safe areas" but the majority of these areas have been 
far from safe. In a May 9, 1994 report by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he 
pointed out that the ":;afe area" concept has been applied with a greater degree of 
effectiveness in Srebrenica and Zepa than in the other four areas.3~» While not 100% 
effective, the Secretary-General points out that the presence of peacekeepers in these 
towns has served to enhance the security of the population and stabilize the situation in 
these areas. 
Despite the fact that it has achieved some success in these two areas the idea has 
not been as effective in the other four areas. But if anyone is to blame for the failure 
of the safe area idea, it is not UNPROFOR. The fault lies with the Security Council and 
UN member-states since they have failed to provide UNPROFOR with the necessary 
resources to carry out this duty. For example, when the Serbs began to overrun the safe 
haven of Gorazde in March 1994) UNPROFOR only had eight military observers in the 
area who could do little more than watch the Serbian offensive. 305 How can the 
Security Council expect UNPROFOR to use the presence of eight military observers to 
deter attacks on a town with a population of 65,000 people? The only function they 
could serve would be to call for NATO air strikes but even eight observers would not 
suffice for that task. When the Security Council was contemplating the establishment of 
safe areas in Bosnia, it adopted the safe area concept with little regard for how it was to 
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be implemented and with minimal consultation with UN commanders. 306 The Security 
Council, without knowing whether the proper resources would be availabie, established 
the safe-areas. What resulted was six "safe areas" that have been repeatedly and 
consistently attacked, shelled, and in some cases, overrun. Poor, though this result 
might seem, it could be argued that whole-scale slaughters have been avoided in places 
such a~ Gorazde due to the attempt to demarcate "safe areas. 1' 
Even though UNPROFOR has not experienced success with the safe-area concept, 
it has meet with some conditional success on three other fronts: the ban on military 
flights, the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport, and the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. If one examines the ban on military flights in the strictest sense of the 
meaning then there is no doubt that it has failed as there have been over 1, 700 recorded 
violations as of June 1994. However, if the ban is viewed through a less restrictive lens, 
then it could be argued that it has been a partial success since the no-fly zone has 
achieved its principal purpose of eliminating air power for combat purposes. 3117 
Regarding the airport, UNPROFOR successfully re-opened the Sarajevo airport 
in early July 1992 and despite the fact that it was forced to temporarily close several 
times, as a result of heavy fighting, UNPROFOR has managed to keep it open for 
humanitarian flights. As of the end of June 1994, twenty nations have flown over 10,000 
flights into the Sarajevo airport bringing in more than 116,000 tonnes of food and 14,000 
tonnes of medicine.308 But how much of this aid has actually made it to the intended 
targets? Has UNPROFOR's humanitarian operation been able to get all of the aid 
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through? The answer is no. They have not guided 100% of the aid through, but 
UNPROFOR has met with more success than is generally acknowledged in protecting, 
escorting, and delivering humanitarian assistance. At times, UNPROFOR has been able 
to successfully deliver food supplies but at other times the local parties have obstructed 
its efforts and denied it access to areas of need. 
It is very difficult to determine what portion of the aid is reaching the intended 
targets as estimates have ranged from 20% to 80% of food and medical supplies being 
diverted to the fighters and the black market.309 The percentages do vary but there can 
be no doubt that ther~ have been large proportions of aid diverted to the soldiers and the 
black market where the aid is then sold or traded for weapons. But is this sufficient to 
call L'NPROFOR's humanitarian opern.tion a failure? It could be argued that even if 
80% of the food is being diverted to the fighters, then there is 20% more aid getting 
through than if UNPROFOR and the humanitarian organizations were not present. There 
is no doubt that a certain percentage of food is being diverted to the fighters, but another 
important percentage is also reaching the people for whom it was intended. Despite the 
problems facing UNPROFOR, its humanitarian relief efforts, and its very presence itself, 
have no doubt saved thousands of lives. Although it is almost impossible to determine 
the exact number of lives involved, there is no doubt that UNPROFOR has been able to 
save a large number of Bosnians. According to Kofi Annan, Under-Secretary-General 
for Peace-keeping Operations, UN peacekeepers last winter saved the lives of three 
million people. 310 
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By examini11g all of the successes, failures, and problems of UNPROFOR, has 
the operation, to date, made a difit:fcnce in Bosnia or has it only aggravated the 
situation? !n short, has UNPROFOR's presence been a help or hindrance? Despite 
UNPROFOR's problems, limitations, and setbacks, the operation has made a positive 
difference in the Bosnian crisis in the terms of lives saved. Although there have been 
a large number of lives lost even with UNPROFOR's presence, that number would have 
been much higher if UNPROFOR had not been present. UNPROFOR's civilian 
component (CIVPOL) has also experienced some degree of success in terms of family 
reunifications, anti-sniping agreements, harvest agreements (Gorazde), body exchanges, 
and prisoner exchanges. 311 UNPROFOR has very serious flaws, but it has experienced 
a greater degree of success than is acknowledged in the news media. Small success 
stories such as the ones described above do not make good headlines so the only time 
UNPROFOR seems to make the news is when it runs into difficulties. In discussing the 
worth of his six month tour as commander of a British UN battalion in Bosnia, Colonel 
Alastair Duncan commented: 
Was it worthwhile? Well, I think it was vny much worthwhile. We saved lives directly, 
and indirectly. We saved lives directly in tho.;e actions where we actually went in Wid pulled 
people out and g\>t them to safety. Indirectly, we were saving lives by those 35,000 tonnes 
of aid that we escorted in, and just our physical presence there often calmed things down. 
We fed, or assisted in the feeding of half a million displaced people in our area and we 
calmed the tension down. People thought a bit more before they did things. m 
The same can be said about the whole UN operation in Bosnia. While UNPROFOR has 
been far from a perfect peacekeeping operation it has performed an invaluable duty of 
saving lives. That in itself might be sufficient to consider it a partial success. 
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UNPROFOR has saved lives but some contend that its relief efforts amount to 
little more than "humanitarian palliatives" which have only served to prolong the war. 
Every since the onset of the humanitarian operation in Bosnia, it has been faced with a 
lingering question: has humanitarian aid prolonged the war? In a study carried out by 
the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute on humanitarian action in Yugoslavia, the Institute 
points out that it is hard to answer this question because of the difficulty of monitoring 
the aid. 313 However, while the study does not give a definitive answer, it cites several 
examples which show a possible link between humanitarian aid and the continuing 
war.314 
Indeed, it is quite possible that the humanitarian operatk"" has played some role 
in prolonging the war. However, regardless of what role it has played in extending the 
conflict, the humanitarian efforts have succeeded in saving the lives of many civilians 
throughout Bosnia. As one UNHCR protection officer remarked about the connection 
between humanitarian aid and the continuing war: 
Our presence here in some ways perpetuates the war. But without us being here, be assured 
that many, many people would not survive. Can we simply let them he sacrificed in the 
n11me of some principle?m 
Perhaps the role of humanitarian action in the Bosnia conflict, and also in other wars, 
has been summed up best by a study group of Thomas J. Watson Institute: 
In short, prolonging wars is a risk inherent to humanitarian action. If preventing the 
belligerents from receiving any benefits were the objective, no life-saving efforts at all would 
be launched. If the outcome of this war on the humanitarian side is somehow positive, the 
fact that humanitarian organizations sustained the war will be less of an issue. However, the 
humanitarian consequences could be catastrophic if-seized by a sudden awareness of the 
connection-the international community wer~ to disengage.'16 
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CHAPTER 5 - THE FUTURE FOR UNPROFOR AND UNITED NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING 
The Bosnian war is a very complex conflict that has presented UN peacekeepers 
with one of their most difficult assignments to date. But despite these problems 
UNPROFOR has remained in Bosnia for over two years and it will more than likely 
remain there in the near future. Its future presence in Bosnia rests upon two factors: the 
cooperation of the local parties and continued consensus among the Great Powers that 
UNPROFOR's mission should be sustained. While it is possible that the lack of 
cooperation might force UNPROFOR to withdraw, this does not seem likely. 
Cooperation has been lacking for over two and a half years, and if UNPROFOR were 
going to pull out for this reason, it would have done it a long time ago. 
A Security Council decision to lift the UN imposed arms embargo on the 
conflicting parties in Bosnia, for example, could render UNPROFOR's position 
untenable. The United States has already decided to stop enforcing the arms embargo 
but the implications of this decision on the future of UNPROFOR remains unclear. 317 
Great Power consensus might break down leading to the adoption of unilateral initiatives 
which might necessitate UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Furthermore, the creation of a new 
consensus directed towards more forceful international intervention in the Bosiiian 
conflict similarly would require UNPROFOR's removal. At the moment though, there 
is no immediate prospect that new initiatives will be pursued. But if the peacekeepers 
are forced to withdraw for any of the above reasons, or for other unforseen causes, 
UNPROFOR can leave Bosnia knowing that, under very pernicious conditions, it carried 
out its assigned duties more effectively than generally has been acknowledged. 
The conflict in Bosnia not only presents the peacekeepers with a difficult 
situation, it also introduces a dilemma for the future of peacekeeping in general - should 
a peacekeeping operation be deployed in the middle of a conflict or should its deployment 
be delayed until there is real peace to keep? There is a case to be made on both sides. 
One can argue that UNPROFOR's presence in Bosnia merely has served to prolong the 
war and has contributed to a general weakening of international support for 
peacekeeping. Regarding the latter argument, Nigel White has indicated that the UN 
operation in Bosnia, and also the one in Somalia, appear to be 
a dangerous step taken by the newly revitalized Security Council in that they destroy the 
distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement which not only endangers genuine 
peacekeeping operations around the world but also the confidence of states or parties in 
requesting such forces simply because the United Nations, in its peacekeeping role, is no 
longer seen as neutral, impartial and non-interventionist.311 
Alan Jzmes also poses the question as to whether operations such as UNPROFOR have 
had a weakening effect on international support for peacekeeping. He asks whether 
"going so briskly down the internal ~cekeeping path, the UN is heading for - and 
perhaps has reached - a resounding dead end?'·319 But even though he questions the 
validity of internal peacekeeping, James concludes that it should not be seen as having 
reached a dead end. 
Rosalyn Higgins goes one step further and argues that UNPROFOR in Bosnia was 
a mistake. She contends that 
the reality is that we have chosen to respond to major unlawful violence, not by stopping lilat 
violence, but by trying to provide relief to thP. suffering. But our choic~ of policy allows the 
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suffllring to continue.)~, 
H~ggins raises a very valid and accurate point. ~! has been argued that full scale military 
intervention, such as that used in Iraq, might have proved to have been a better option. 
Whether it would have or not might be debated.321 What is known, however, is that 
in conflicts, such as the Bosnian one, it is highly unlikely, for reasons to be explained 
shortly, that collectivt! military action will be used. Therefore, one can insist that 
peacekeeping is, and will continue to be the only option that the international community 
is willing to use to respond to these types of conflicts. 
When the world is confronted with a Bosnia, Somalia, or Rwanda, and the 
international community decides to act, the unly organization that has the ability to 
attempt to respond to these conflicts is the United Nations. When a Bosnia emerges onto 
the world scene the UN is left with three choices: 
-do nothing, 
-use collective action as was the case in Somalia, Korea, and l:aq-Kuwait, 
-use sanctions, negotiation, mediation, and good offices in an attempt to 
bring an end to the conflict and through the use of peacekeepers provide 
humanitarian assistance to help alleviate the suffering of the civilian 
population. 
The first choice, do nothing, is a frequently used option of the international 
community. There can be little argument that the Bosnian war is a horrific conflict but 
equally appalling carnage and bloodshed are also taking place in other comers of the 
globe such as Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and 
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Tajakistan,322 and in each of these conflicts the international community has decided 
to do nothing. Indeed, when a conflict does not directly threaten the interests of the 
Greal Powers, then it is quite likely that it will either be ignored or receive very little 
attention. In most instances, the international community, or more appropriately the 
Great Powers, decide to respond to these conflicts only after the atrocities and suffering 
that accvmpany these wars are broadcast across television screens around the world 
~CNN Factor). When this happens the Great Powers are frequently pressured to "do 
something" by their citizens and this usually evokes some kind of response, either in the 
form of collective action or peacekeeping. 
Collective action, in the form of enforcement or intervention is a route that the 
international community will likely not travel. The problem with it is the reluctance of 
UN member-states to use it. Only three times in the last 45 years (Korea in the early 
1950's, Iraq-Kuwait in 1991, and Somalia in 1993) has collective action been used by 
the international community and each time it required the lead of the United States. 
Without an American lead, these operations would probably never have been initiated. 
The Bo!:nian operation has proved this point. The U.S. government was, and still is, 
reluctant to send troops into Bosnia, whether as an intervention force or as part of a 
peacekeeping operation, unless there is a comprehensive and lasting ~~-fire. In future 
conflicts, collective action will only be used when the U.S. is willing to lead and it is for 
this reason that this option will remain an infrequently used tool by the international 
community. 
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Since collective action is highly doubtful, the most likely choice of the 
international community will be peacekeeping because it represents a middle ground 
between absolute non-intervention and full scale military intervention. m It allows 
Western governments to claim they are doing something without incurring the costs that 
full scale military intervention would bring and the criticisms that non-intervention would 
provoke. Western governments could not ignore the conflict in Bosnia, but they were 
unwilling to use military intervention, either unilaterally or as a UN multi-national force, 
because of the anticipated high costs. o~~ liie Security Council chose the middle 
ground in Bosnia, it became apparent that peacekeeping might not have been the most 
appropriate choice. But regardless of whether it was or not, the UN is now involved and 
getting out will prove to be very difficult. 
Another dilemma concerning peacekeeping during an armed conflict revolves 
around the image of impartiality. When a peacekeeping operation is deployed in the 
middle of a war zone, the operation coulcf very well be regarded as favouring one side 
over the other. The Bosnian operation has illustrated this point. Bosnian Serbs might 
view UNPROFOR as partial because they view its intervention into the conflict as giving 
an advantage to the Muslims in that it has prevented the latter from losing the war. They 
may also regard UNPROFOR as standing in the way of their major objective - union 
with Serbia proper. On the other side of the conflict, the Muslims may also consider 
UNPROFOR as being partial because it has failed to stop a Serbian war machine from 
occupying over 70% of Bosnia. For example, the Muslims might have viewed the UN's 
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inability to stop Serb advancements in areas such as Gorazde, Sarajevo, and Bihac 
(supposed safe havens), as implicit support to the Bosnian Serbs. Muslims may also look 
at UNPROFOR as preserving the status quo, which favours the Bosnian Serbs. There 
are no easy solutions or answers to these dilemmas, but they require serious 
consideration before future UN operations are carried out in conflicts such as Bosnia. 
Given the probability that international peacekeeping efforts will continue, it is 
important to dr-t.w lessons from the Bosnian experience.324 UNPROFOR's experience 
seems to confirm the point that the political context, in terms of the type of conflict and 
the support of the international community and local parties, is the most important 
characteristic that determines the effectiveness and feasibility of a peacekeeping 
operation. While funding, planning and implementation of an operation are important, 
they do not have a huge effect on a mission's overall success. In a recent study of six 
peacekeeping operations, Paul Diehl concluded that "more than any other set of factors, 
the political context into which the peacekeeping forces were sent affected the success 
or failure of the operation .... "325 
Peacekeeping has the potential to play a positive role in the post-Cold War era but 
the international community must lessen its expectations before the promising enterprise 
is ruined. The international community demands too much from peacekeeping 
operations. UN member-states should not expect that by simply placing an i.il equipped 
and badly financed peacekeeping operation into a war zone that the conflict will cease 
and peace be reached. Peacekeeping is not a magical cure for Bosnia or for any other 
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type of conflict as solutions to the Bosniar. conflict lie outside the realm of 
UNPROFOR's mandate. That applies not only to UNPROFOR but to all other UN 
peacekeeping operations and the conflicts in which they are involved. Though not a 
cure-all, peacekeeping missions can exercise a positive influence. In Bosnia the biggest 
contribution that a peacekeeping operation can make is trying to feed and protect the 
civilians from the effects of the war. To ask, or ex}X!Ct, the peacekeepers to do any 
more in such conflicts would be unrealistic, impractical, and unfair. 
Conflicts such as the one in Bosnia should not be ignored. Whatever method the 
international community chooses, collective action, intervention, sanctions, or 
peacekeeping and/or negotiation, these conflicts must be addressed. It would be a 
mistake to believe that such conflicts are important only to the immediate participants. 
During conflicts such as the one in Bosnia, many citizens flee to bordering states in order 
to escape the immense human suffering and tragedy that accompany these wars. This 
influx of refugees places an immense strain on the political and economic institutions of 
the neighbouring states and further de-stabilizes the region. Besides this problem, there 
is also the possibility that these conflicts could lead to wider warfare. For example, an 
outside state or group of states might be drawn into such conflicts in cases where ethnic 
loyalties come into play. The immense human suffering that accompanies these conflicts 
is more than enough reason for the international community to act but they must also act 
because these conflicts have a very serious potential to threaten international peace and 
security. 326 
100 
Humanitarian aid is needed in the Bosnian conflict, but it will not solve the crisis 
because the relief addresses the symptoms rather than the causes of the conflict. What 
is needed alongside the humanitarian aid is some sort of political and social 
reconstruction. While the UN can help the local parties along with this reconstruction, 
it ultimately depends on the Bosnians themselves. 
In the post-Cold War era, peacekeepers are g~ing to be confronted with conflicts 
that are just as, or even more, dangerous than Bosnia. In future operations, consent 
cannot always be assumed and cease-fires will not always be present. With respect to 
UNPROFOR, and future operations of the like, the UN and its members are going to 
have to ask the following question; despite all the difficulties and limitations confronting 
the operation is enough aid still reaching the starving civilians to counterbalance the 
larger amounts being diverted to the w41Ting parties?327 
The Bosnian war has shown that regional organizations are not sufficient by 
themselves to deal with conflicts such as Bosnia.328 Indeed, in most cases regional 
organizations do not have the necessary mechanisms to adequately respond to conflicts 
that are present in their areas. But this does not mean that regional organizations cannot 
lend a hand to help solve the crisis. NATO support of UN peacekeeping efforts in 
Bosnia has shown that regional organizations can play a positive role in conflict 
resolution. However, their role normally should be in support of rather than as an 
alternative to the UN. As Olara Otunnu, an African ambassador, has pointed out: 
I do not believe that it will be possible in the near future for regional organizations to 
respond effectively to the challenge of conflicts within stat.:s. Few regional organizations 
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have relevant traditions ... Aiso, regional groups often suffer from the perception of being 
partisan ... Moreover, in the case of Third World regional organizations, there is also the 
problem of resources ... {FJor the foreseeable future, peacekeeping will have to be the 
responsibility of the United Nations.'~9 
Bosnia's greatest lesson is that the UN should begin to focus its efforts more on 
preventing the outbreak of hostilities rather than on trying to manage or end a conflict 
once it has erupted. As Thomas Weiss points out: 
What is required is nothing less than a shift in the dominant way that the internationltl 
community attacks problems. In formulating responses, new policy lenses should be tinted 
with preventive peace building rather than intervention in and management of confliciS once 
they have erupted. The root causes of many confliciS·poverty, and the unjust distribution of 
available resources, and the legacy of colonial boundaries in mMy multiethnic societies-
should be addressed before they exp\ode.JlO 
UNPROFOR in the fanner Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has shown that preventive 
peacekeeping can work, but there is a potential deficiency with this type of operation as 
there are no contingency plans or additional troops in place if the peacekeepers are 
attacked. To date, the operation in Macedonia has been successful but what are the 
peacekeepers going to do if they are attacked by one or more of the local parties? If they 
withdraw at the first sign of trouble, then preventive peacekeeping will be shown as 
nothing but a bluff. If this happened, it would send a message out to would-be 
combatants that the UN does not have the ability, or will, to back up the operation with 
additional troops. This was in effect what happened in Bosnia when the headquarters for 
UNPROFOR in Croatia was stationed in Sarajevo as it was thought that the presence of 
UN personnel in Bosnia would deter the fighting. The military personnel involved with 
the operation warned against such a move but the politicians insisted, citing the fact that 
the presence of UNPROFOR personnel might prevent the outbreak of fighting. 
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However, the UN failed to address the possibility that fighting might erupt and did not 
consider what UNPROFOR personnel were to do in this event. Unfortunately, the UN 
had no contingency plans in place, and what resulted was a UN operation caught up in 
the middle of an armed conflict without a mandate. 
The UN must have some type of mechanism available to deal with the possibility 
of preventive peacekeepers being attacked. The best response would be for the UN to 
back up the smaller preventive force with a larger force, possibly something like 
Operation Desert Storm which was used during the Gulf War in 1991. But it is highly 
unlikely that such a force, or even a scaled down version, would be assembled if the 
peacekeepers in Macedonia are attacked. The reason being is that the international 
community, or more appropriately the Great Powers, appear to lack the will or interest 
to intervene. Only when a region is of strategic or national interest will the principal 
powers take some forceful action. The will was there to assemble a force in Iraq during 
the Gulf War, and again in the iall of 1994 when Iraq started to mobilize troops near the 
Kuwaiti border. However, the will is unlikely to be present in Macedonia if the 
operation runs into trouble. Preventive peacekeeping is a good idea, but the UN must 
take a serious look at what actions will be taken if the preventive force is attacked. 
There has been a lot of finger pointing in relation to the blame for the war in 
Bosnia and Yugoslavia. Outside powers undoubtedly deserve criticism but it is the 
political and military leaders in ex-Yugoslavia who are to blame for the war. When it 
comes right down to it, it is these people and not the policies of Western governments, 
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who are truly responsible for the war. The same people are also the only ones who are 
able to end the war. In the words of Ralph Johnson, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for European and Canadian affairs: 
The bottom line in this crisis, however, is that the world community cKnnot stop Yugoslavs 
from killing one another so long as they are determined to do so. What we CIUl do ia u~~e our 
influence and powers of persuasion to convince the parties to this conflict that they cKnnot 
win, and, indeed, can only lose, if the violence is not stopped. We ciUl a&-ure them that they 
will have our support and good will if they tum away from killing and sit down in good faith 
to work out a fair and equitable solution .... But we ourselves cannot stop the violence or 
resolve this conflict. Only the peoples of Yugoslavia and their leaden: can do that.m 
Just as the policies of Western governments cannot be blamed for causing the war 
in Bosnia neither can the UN. In no way can UNPROFOR be blamed for accelerating 
the conflict in Bosnia and it would be illogical to argue otherwise. The desire to reach 
settlements or to make peace rests solely on the shoulders of the local parties and if that 
desire is absent then the warring factions will continue to fight. The desire of the Serbs, 
Croats, and Muslims to make peace was, and still is, very low in Bosnia and it is 
unlikely that it would be any higher if UNPROFOR was not there. m 
Although UNPROFOR can be viewed as a substitute for intervention it cannot be 
looked upon as standing in the way of more forceful action on the part of the 
international community. When the terrible humanitarian tragedies of the Bosnian 
conflict began to appear on television screens across the world, the international 
community was pressured to "do something." It was unwilling to send in an intervention 
force so the UN decided to deploy a peacekeeping operation. Indeed, UNPROFOR is 
a substitute for intervention but it was either do nothing or send in the blue helmets. 
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This is not necessarily a bad thing as UNPROFOR has made a positive difference in 
Bosnia, but the international community must realize that UNPROFOR is not capable of 
solving the conflict. UNPROFOR does not stand in the way of more forceful action 
because the international community, or more appropriately the major powers, lack the 
will to intervene in this messy conflict. Indeed, intervention in Bosnia would be a 
difficult, and now quite possibly, an unrealistic task. The argument i:; not that the 
international community should intervene but rather that the peacekeepers did not prevent 
the deployment of an intervention force. 333 
In the new world order that has emerged since the end of the Cold War, only the 
Great Powers, especially the U.S., are capable of maintaining a stable and peaceful 
world. But the Bosnian experience has shown that they will not always be up to the task 
and in these situations peacekeeping will likely be the choice of action by the 
international community. Intervention, or the use of force, will be used only when the 
United States is willing to take the lead, and in cases where it is not, the international 
community will usually respond with a peacekeeping operation. It may not always be 
the most appropriate choice, but what other alternatives are the international community 
truly willing to use. 
The UN is not and cannot be a sovereign political actor in a world made up of 
over 180 independent and sovereign nation-states.334 The UN can only perfonn as w~ll 
as its member-states will allow it. How can the UN itself be blamed for world problems 
when it is the member-states in the UN, particularly the Security Council, which decide 
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the how, when, where, and why of its actions? It is always puzzling to hear people say 
that the UN has failed in Bosnia. It is not the UN that has failed, rather it is the 
member-states with their unrealistic eJ;pectations which have failed the UN. When 
member-states want the UN io work it will work. What the UN needs are more 
members who are willing to contribute to its success and fewer member-states who are 
quick to point fingers at it for the world's problems. In the words of Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali: 
The chief problem from my point of view is one of education. The same member states that 
were prepared to spend $100 billion everyday to sustain the Cold War are not willing to 
spend $100 billion or $200 billion to sustain the UN system. That i11 u. contradiction.33S 
When Yugoslavia began to fall apart, the international community took a narrow-
minded approach by supporting, or more appropriately pushing, the status quo. Instead 
of taking a one track apprcach, Christopher Cviic points out that no solutions, including 
the demise of Yugoslavia, should have been ruled out.336 When the international 
community initially pushed for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia it should have told 
Serbia's leader, Slobodan Milosevic, that this was not support for his re-centralization 
of the Yugoslav state. Furthermore, it should have been clearly stated to Milosevic that 
any use of force to keep the republics from seceding would be met with their full 
diplomatic recognition as independent states, giving them the right to arm and defend 
themselves as sovereign entities.337 However, the international community took a one 
sided approach by more or less threatening Croatia and Slovenia not to secede. The 
political leaders in these republics were left in a very difficult position: either accept a 
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stronger centralized Yugoslavia under the dominant rule of Milosevic and Serbia, or 
secede and take the risks that would come with it. Obviously, to them, the latter seemed 
like the best option. A more appropriate course of action by the international community 
might have been to accept the fact that Yugoslavia was going to come apart and 
concentrate its energy towards a more peaceful separation. 
By far, the biggest UN error regarding the Bosnian conflict revolves around its 
imposition of an arms embargo against Bosnia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia. 
By placing an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, the UN not only effectively gave 
the Bosnian Serbs a huge advantage, but it also took away the right of the government 
of Bosnia to defend itself, something which is enshrined in Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. 
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION 
The inherent problem with a case study is that it restricts one to certain 
parameters. In this case study, the restriction applies to humanitarian peacekeeping and 
ethnic conflict in Euror.e. Therefore, what comes out of this case study cannot be 
necessarily applied to all peacekeeping operations. In this instance, the UN operation 
in Bosnia can only be used to reflect back on the aims of humanitarian peacekeeping, as 
opposed to all second generation operations, to determine whether UNPROFOR supports 
or calls into question such endeavours. However, even though it is limited in so1ne 
senses, the UNPROFOR case study involves a central paradox that will likely confront 
future UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era - should peacekeepers be 
used in situations when there is no peace to keep? 
The preceding analysis of UNPROFOR in Bosnia appears to both support and call 
humanitarian peacekeeping into question. UNPROFOR supports the idea of humanitarian 
peacekeeping because it has demonstrated that aid can be delivered and lives saved, even 
in the midst of an armed conflict. But the operation also calls humanitarian peacekeeping 
into question. In Bosnia, it is the local forces more often than the peacekeepers who 
dictate when, where, and what amount of aid will get through. By letting the local 
forces control the delivery of aid, the UN in effect has allowed the Serbs, Croats, and 
Muslims, to dictate its job. In essence, the local parties became the UN's boss. 
Looking back, it is apparent that the UN was not initially as tough with the local 
forces as they should have been. If they had been tougher in getting aid through during 
the initial stages of the operation, it might have sent a message to the Serbs, Muslims, 
and Croats that the UN was serious about its duties. By doing th:s, the UN might have 
established itself as the boss and showed the local parties that UNPROFOR was going 
to dictate the deliver of aid. But this problem relates back to the paradox of 
peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep. In Bosnia, many of the local forces are 
not under any effective political control and therefore it is hard for the peacekeepers to 
know who they are dealing with. Military forces, under effective control, normally 
prove to be more predictable since they have someone to answer to fc.. thelr actions. 
However, it might prove more difficult with local warlords or paramilitary forces that 
are not under any control since their reactions to pushing aid through might prove to be 
unpredictable. It might work in some situations and in others it could prove to be 
catastrophic. 
The dil~mma concerning UNPRGFOR in Bosnia indeed raises a serious 
predicament that needs to be examined when similar operations are being contemplated. 
Is saving the lives of tens of thousands of people sufficient reason to deploy peacekeepers 
in the middle of a conflict? Or are the risk and dangers that accompany these battles too 
great to put UN peacekeepers in? There are no easy answers but in future operations the 
UN could be guided by the following questions: is there a reasonable expectation that the 
peacekeepers can reduce the suffering and does the UN have the resources and 
capabilities to do it? 
The Bosnian case study has not only illustrated the difficulties of peacekeeping 
when there is no peace to keep, but it has also demonstrated that the true idea behind 
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collective security, as it was intended by the founders of the Charter, is not feasible. All 
against one will not work and the Bosnian conflict has proven this point. To be fair, 
however, collective action in Bosnia would not be an easy task because of the 
complexities of the conflict. But despite this fact, the true idea of collective security will 
not work because UN member-states will, most of the time, only act when the conflict 
or act of aggression directly or indirectly threatens their national interest. Even in 
situations where national interests are threatened, collective action will only be used, or 
contemplated, when one or more of the principal powers are involved. In mo~t other 
cases, states will usually resort to unilateral actions. Indeed, the UN as an organizer and 
operator of military forces is unfeasible. Then what role can the UN's collective security 
system expect to play in the post-Cold War era? The legitimator model and the broker 
model seem to be two possible alternatives to the UN's collective n.ecurity system.m 
The legitimator model, advocated by William Durch, views the Security Council 
as the most practical means of initiating collective action. It has been shown time and 
time again, that member-states are not willing to let the UN itself carry out collective 
military operations. Most states, especially the U.S., do not want to put. their forces 
under the command of the UN. The legitimator model advocates that the Security 
Council contract out large scale military tasks to a certain country or countries. In this 
type of model the UN is not directly involved in the recruiting of forces or the planning 
or supporting stages of the operation.339 The advantage with this model is that it gives 
the operation international legitimacy without actually having the UN involved in the 
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command and control Operation Desert Storm, under the lead of the United States 
during the Gulf War in 1991, is an example of the legitimator model. The Security 
Council, more or less, contracted out the task of removing Iraqi military forces from 
Kuwait to the United States. The U.S., which willingly accepted the task, then took the 
initiative upon itself to assemble the needed coalition by finding or pursuing other UN 
member-states who were willing to take part in the operation. Indeed, the United States 
had its own reasons to push Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, but by putting the operation 
under the auspices of the UN, it was legitimized more than if the U.S had carried out 
unilateral military action. By placing the operation under UN sponsorship, a broad 
coalition, that was eventually supported by a large part of the international community, 
was able to be assembled. 
The legitimator model has its advantages but it also has some problems. William 
Durch points out that a major flaw with this model is that Security Council resolutions 
do not guarantee international action. The resolution is unlikely to pass unless one of the 
permanent Security Council members, which still possess much of the military power in 
the world, is prepared to take the lead or assemble the necessary coalition. 340 In most 
cases, when the national interests of the Security Council members are not at stake then 
collective action will be unlikely. The other problem with the legitimator model is that 
it works only when the country or countries involved play by the rules set out by the 
Security Council. Durch contends that the legitimator model worked in the Gulf War 
because the United States and other UN member-states stayed within the parameters set 
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out by the Security Council. When the coalition forces pushed Iraq out of Kuwait, the 
war was halted. If the U.S. had continued to push into Iraqi territory, something the 
Security Council did not empower it to do, then the legitimacy and credibility of the 
multi-national force and the UN would have been damaged. 
The second model concerns the UN as a broker for military actions. With this 
model the UN takes on more responsibilities by making sure all the necessary pieces of 
the operation are put together. For example, it allocates the necessary manpower and 
other required resources and then hands over the operation's command and control to a 
specific country which would then act as an agent for the Security Counci1.341 The lead 
country, the UN, or both, would then recruit other states to take part in the operation. 
This type of model, as is the case with the Iegitimator model, would have the support of 
the Security Council and a greater degree of international legitimacy than if an operation 
went ahead without the blessing of the UN. But again, there is a problem with this type 
of model. In both the legiti.,ator and broker model a lead country is needed, and if it 
is always the U.S. that takes the lead then the UN would look like nothing more than a 
tool for American foreign policy. Durch contends that the way to deal with this problem 
is for the U.S. to seek overall command only when its ground forces are involved. In 
situations where they are not, the U.S. could give the lead to another country but still 
remain a part of the operation by providing important resources such as air power, 
intelligence reports, and logistical support. As Durch says, "subordinating such functions 
to others' command on occasion may indeed prove necessary to keep others willing to 
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subordinate themselves to us. "lo'2 3y doing this, the UN would look less like a tool for 
American foreign policy and more as a representative of the will of the international 
community. 
Even though these models appear workable in the post-Cold War era, they still 
exhibit an inherent problem. Collective action will only be userl when the U.S. or the 
lead country has a direct or indirect national interest in the conflict. Iraq and Bosnia 
prove this point. Collective action was used in Iraq because the national interests of 
some of the principal powers were at risk. The conflict in Bosnia does not bear on the 
national interests of the major military powe:-s and for this reason collective action seems 
highly unlikely. 
It is always difficult to predict the future of global politics, and in the constantly 
changing world of the post-Cold War era, this task has become even more difficult. 
However, with respect to UN collective security, it seems safe to predict that it will only 
be used in circumstances where the national interests of the major powers are involved. 
When the Great Powers want action, it will be taken. In other cases, such as the many 
"small wars" that are confronting our globe, it appears that they will most often be 
thrown onto the doorstep of the UN. When this does happen, it seems that peacekeeping 
may be the only viable option. Indeed, what most states, especially the major powers, 
use the UN for is not for its true purpose of collective security but rather as a residual 
conflict tool, dealing with conflicts that nobody else wants. In the end, in a world 
comprised of over 180 independent and sovereign states, that might be the best role the 
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UN can be expected to play. 
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TABLE 1- RE.~OLUI'IONS ESTABLISHING UNPROFOR'S MANDATE 
RESOLUTIONS 
758 (08 JUN 92) 
761 (29 JUN 92) 
770 (13 AUG 92) 
Acting under Chapter 
VII 
776 (14 SEI' 92) 
78 I (09 OCT 92) 
816 (31 MAR 93) 
Acting under Chapter 
VII 
819 (16 APR 93) 
Acting under Chapter 
VII 
824 (06 MAY 93) 
Acting under Chapter 
VII 
836 (04 JUN 93) 
Acting under Chapter 
VII 
SC-Security Council 
SO-Sec retary-Oeneral 
UNPROFOR'S MANDATED DUTIES 
UNPROFOR 's mandate extended to ensure the security and functioning of the 
Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia. 
SC authorizes the SO to immediately deploy additional elements of UNPROFOR to 
carry out the ta.sla in resolution 758. 
SC calls on all states to •take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements 
all necessary measures• to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo 
and other parts of Bosnia. 
SC authorizes the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate to provide protection to 
UNHCR organized humanitarian convoys and to convoys of released civilian detainees 
if requested by ICRC. 
SC establishes a ban on military flights in Bosnia and requests UNPROFOR to 
monitor compliance with the no-fly zone. 
SC authorizes member-states, acting nationally or through regional organizations of 
arrangements, to take, under the authority of the SC and in close coordination with the 
SO and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the ban. 
Srebrenica established as a •safe area. • SO demands that Srebrenica and its 
surrounding areas be treated as a safe area which should be free from armed attacks or 
hostile acts. SO requests UNPROFOR to monitor the humanitarian situation in the 
safe area. 
1n addition to Srebrenica, the SC declares that the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
~larajevo, and other sucb threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Gorazde, 
Bihac, and Zepa should be treated as safe areas by all parties concerned and should be 
free from nrmed attacks or hostile acts. 
SC extends UNPROFOR's mandate in order to enable it to deter attacks against the 
safe areas of Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Oorazde, Bihac, and Zepa. SC authorizes 
UNPROFOR, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use 
of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or the 
armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around 
those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian 
aid convoys. SC also decides that members states, acting nationally or through 
regional organizations of arrangements, may take, under the authority of the SC and 
subject to close coordination with the SO and UNPROFOR all necessary measures, 
through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in Bosnia, to support 
UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate. 
SOUllCil: Ullilcd Naliooa Dotllmca& DPVIJ12/Rev.2, March IS, 1994. 
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TABLE 2- SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE ON BOSNIAN RESOLUTIONS 
RESOLUTION u.s. 
758 (08 JUNE 92) SUP 
761 (29 JUNE 92) SUP 
770 (13 AUG 92) SUP 
776 (14 SEPT 92) SUP 
781 (09 OCT 92) SUP 
816 (31 MAR 93) SUP 
819 (16 APR 93) SUP 
824 (06 MAY 93) SUP 
836 (04 JUNE 93) SUP 
SUP-supported the resolution 
ADS-Abstained on the resolution 
RUSSIA 
SUP 
SUP 
SUP 
SUP 
SUP 
SUP 
SUP 
SUP 
SUP 
•on these resolutions India and Zimbabwe also abstained 
**On this resolution Pakistan and Venezuela abstained 
CHINA BRITAIN FRANCE 
SUP SUP SUP 
SUP SUP SUP 
ABS SUP SUP 
ABS SUP SUP 
ABS SUP SUP 
ABS SUP SUP 
SUP SUP SUP 
SUP SUP SUP 
SUP SUP SUP 
VOTE 
15-0 
15-0 
12-0* 
12-0* 
14-0 
14-0 
15-0 
15-0 
13-0"'* 
SOIJRCB: UN O!rottlck. voi.XXIX, no.l (Scplealber 1992), 10 IDd 12 fur 758 mcl761, rupcdivcty; UN a.n..Jclr, voi.XXXIX, oo.4 (l>ccad•:r 
1992), 21 mcl2Hot" 770 mcl776, rapcclivdy; UN a.n..Jck, voi.XXX, no.l (lof.anb 1993), Hor781; UN a.n..Jck, voi.XXX, no.2 (Juno 1993), 
6 fat" 816; UN Otrtinlck, voi.XXX, ao.J (September 1993), II aDd 12 fat" 819 Mel 824; rapcclivcl)'; Mel FMdttt Po&y 8Mllrdlt, vol.4, DO. I 
(JIIIy/Aua~~atl993). 19 for 836. 
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TABlE 3 • CIIRONOI..oGY Of NATO IN'VOI.VEMENT IN BOSNIA 
I>ATI! NA 111RE OP INVOL VI!MENT 
OCfOUI!R 16, 1992 NATO lqm IDDililoriq fli&hla ia lbc ainpacc of s-u.-HenqoviM. 
APRil. 8, 1993 NATO II"'" to ml"orcc lbc oo-fly 11011e. 
JULY 22, 1993 Rc:.o!uti011 836 ..U NATO to provide procccl.ive air power to UNPROPOR iD perf~ it. lll.llld..IC. 
AtJOIJ!t'T 2 A 9, 1993 NATO drcidc. to be ready to arry out air llrikca to prcvcat lbc "lttiii&'Ulatioa" of Sarajevo. 
l1l!JIIUIARY II, 1~ NATO acu -a llllimalum for lbc wichdrawal of Serbian IIQ~ wcqo~~~ from around lbc 2~ exclulioo 
zone iD Sarajevo. Oa lbc buia d tbc clcc:iaioa.l t.ltea 011 A"'\\lt 2 and 9, 1993, air attikca, in cloee 
eootliillal.i011 with lbc UN Sccmuy-<JcDen.l, arc a\llboriud 11aiDat Serbian bc.l~ wc.pODS if lbcy arc DOt 
tcmOYr.d fram lbc culwoioo ZIJIIC or pl.or:cd uader lbc COOIIIWid of UNPROPOR. 
11l!JIRUARY 28, 1994 NATO W&IPI&!Ie<llboot dowa four Scrttilll ain:raft iD violatioa o( lbc DO-fly IIOIIC. Thia awb lbc rtnt 
milituy acti011 t.kCII by NATO iD ill 4S year billofy. 
APRIL 10, 1994 NATO W&IP!ma, iD rcapooac: 101 rcqucot by UNPROPOR, bomb Serbian posil.i~ 11U1 the beaiq:td 
MUIIim coc:llve or Ooru.dc. Thia awb NATO's first aroun4 albdt iD it. 4S year bistory. 
APRIL II, 1994 Por 1bc ~eeood time iD u awl)' days, NATO W&IPI&Des &trike Serbian poeitioas ;IJUIIIId Oorazdc dcsltO)'ina 
a Iaiit and scvctal pc.-.oaoel canieno 
APRIL 22, 1994 NATO oda on Lllllmatum for lbc /.• .•-:~.IJl Scrba 10 cuac tbcir allacb 011 Oorazdc ~ wilbdraw lbcir bc.l~ 
wcqo~~~IO 20 tiJomdRI from lbc ccatcr o( tbc IOWD. Olbcrwilc, NATO would CUT)' ou: ~ strikes 
qainat BocUao Serb bc.l~ 111eqo111 and olbcr lalzdl found withiD tbc lib! radius from tbc ccattc of 
IOWD. NATO alao affii'IDI i\1 rceolve to 111:1 iD lbc same IIIIDDCt for lbc olbct five clcc:larcd life arcu. 
APRil. 23, 1994 Scrba cootinue abclliDc Ooraz.dc and 1 call for air strikes by lbc UNPROPOR c~r ia reje~:Lcd 
llecauac UN Special &voy Yuuabi Ababi ults for 1 delay to allollllbc Serbian leaden 10 cootaia "I'QIUC" 
clcm..'llll. Thia rejectioa iDfurialu NATO olfteials. 1be Serbs bqin witbdrawilla from Ooru.dc u tbc 
ultimalllm expires. 
APRIL 24, 1994 Por lbc IIIOit pan. the Sctbiao qe of Ooru.dc Cllda u NATO thrcatcaa air lllril:cs if tbc Sc:rba did DOt 
CCIJit'orltC and IUIIO'YC lbcit mi1iWy lllcqolll and lwdwarc oullidc I JluQ radiua. 
AUOUST 5, 1994 NATO ain:raft allack a &c.UaD Serb lalzc:t ac:ar ~o in rupoose 10 lbc Satta acizure of bc.l~ 111capoo1 
frnm a UN •ton&e lite. lmmedialdy after lbc air strike, tbc Serbs offered 10 retura tbc bc.lvy wapoaa. 
SI!PTP.MDI!R 23, 1994 NATO ain:ral\ bl.ut • Scrbi.ul t.mk WeA or ~0 ill rupoDIC to I Serb allack 0111 UN •mouml vehicle 
that wOWided a Pn:ach pcacckcq~Cr. 
SOURCI!: hlfonnatioa from Occobcr 16, 199210 l'ebruuy 28, 199411111 April2210April24, 19941akca from, Hcak Voe and Jamca Bilbray, Dral\ 
Interim Rcpon; NATO, P~tkq~int And TM FtW7MT Ylltasm-la. PreiCIIIcd 10 tbc SlJb.commitlce oa DcfCDCC and Security Co-opcratioa Bccwoca 
l!urope IDd Nord! America,~)' 1994, AIIIIU U; and NATO, "NATO's role ill Crilu Mamccm=tand P1:acctc:cpiDa," /JQsfc Faa $Met No.4, 
NATO Ofr.ce of lnfon~~~tioa Ptua (July 1993); iDfonn.atioa from April!O, 1994 to April! t, 1994 lakco from "Nato Bomb• Serb poeitioas," TM 
Globullll NGII, April!!, 1994, A1; "NATO atritcs Sctbs qaio,"TM ~GNIMGII, Aprill2, 1994, AI, rapccl.ivcly; iDfonnatioa from Aucust 
S, 1994toScplcmbcr 23, 199411kea from, "Satta to rc:tum wcap011111\er NATO air lllril:e, • TM GlobuwlltlaJl, AUflllt6, 1994, AS; and "NATO 
jrill\i1 Scm link in maliatory alrikc, • 1M~ tJIId Mall. Scpt.cmber 24, 1994, A9, rcspcctivcly. 
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TABLE 4 - UNPROFOR PERSONNEL STRENGTII (AS OF NOVEMBER 4, 1994) 
COUNTRY 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Egypt 
France 
Jordan 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Portugal 
Russian Federation 
Spain 
Sweden 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
U.K. 
u.s. 
Subtotal 
Totals (20 Countries) 
BHC • Bolllii·Herucovilla COIDIII&IId 
HQ - Headqv.artcn 
SlY - ScciOr Sarajevo 
REST - Rett of Bolllii-Herucovilla 
HQ 
8 
18 
164 
16 
25 
2 
1 
12 
1 
2 
so 
s 
304 
BHC 
SJV REST 
1220 
267 
814 
121 
425 
3018 561 
100 
1537 
1633 
250 
667 
2999 
498 
1248 
1046 
1463 
567 
77 3014 
·-
4585 16976 
~ 
21865 
Tbia lablc illtludc:a miliwy penoatld (ini'NIIIY, suppott uaib mel milituy obKJVcn) oaJy. Then: uc abo Ullilcd Nlliolu Militaty Oboervera 
(UNMO.) mel Civiliall Police (CJVPOL) Kn'iac wilb UNPilOPOR ia s-..ia 1114 !be breakdaow for lacalioa ia DOl avaiW.Ic. The m&in: 
UNPROPOR opcralioD ill lbe former Y~.Woelavia (Boloia, Crwtia, mel Macalcmia) bu 611 UNMO& mel 717 CJVPOL. 
SOURCE: OffiCC of lbc Spote11111111 Por lbc Sccmary-Ocaenl, Ullilcd Nlliolu, New Yort, NY 10017. 
TABlE 5- PJ.ANN.:U VNI'ROFOR ACTION VJo:.RSUS RESULTS 
PI.ANNI!.Il ACfJON Ac:nJAL RESULTS AS OP AUOUST 1994 
To ...... ,.., the eccurily aod fuocl.icnin& of the San~jevo The aitport wu -ured aod rc-opeacd 011 July 3, 1992. Bdwcco !hi. time aod 
ai1port (Rca 7S8, 761)* Dcccmbet 1994 the airport wu for-ted to lanpOnrily cbc leYcral ~ due lo heavy 
rrabllac but rc-opcocd abonly a&r lhc rrahtioc lllbaidcd. 1bc aitport wu placed 
UDdct UNPROPOR 'a c011trol iD July 1992 aod it lti!l mnaiDs Ullder lbcir c011trol u or 
Dcccmbet 1994. 
To CIDIU"' the dclivcty ol hwnani1arian u•illaiiCc iD A• of tbe cod o( Juae194, twcnl)' IWiooa iD a1moat 10,000 fli&bta have brouabt iD ~ 
~ (Rco7SR, 761) lhlllll6,000 IOU o( food IIIII 14,000 IOU o( mcdieiac. l!ltimatca VII)' 011 ~much 
aiel bu aclllally coaea throuJb to 1boee wbo it wu iDimdcd for. Repoct~ have vuicd 
froml0"-10" o( aiel beiDa divcncd to tbe black awkd 111111 the local frabten. 
[)capite !hi. the relic( opcralioa.l have uved lwDcl.rcdl o( tbouuDd. o( livca iD llomia. 
UNPROI'OR aulboriud lo UIC all DOCCIIU)' mt.UUru to UNPROPOR bu yet 1o UIC for-te to deliver aid iD llomia. 
faclli ... le the dclinty o( bdmanil.lrian aiel (Rca 770, 776) 
SC rcqucata UNPROPOR to monitor the ball uo milil.ll)' A• o( J~me 30, 19941bcre have bcco 1,782 violatiool o( the 11m aiacc IIIOili1oriaa 
nichla iD Doonia (Reo 781) lq111 iD Nov=ber 1992. The 110olly UXIC'I priacjpal purpoec: of elimiaalinc air 
power for cambd purpoaca bu bcco achieved. 
Actinc, natiooally or throuah rqioaal cqanlz.al.ioo• or April 8, 1993 NATO uiiiDlta dais duly 111111011 Apri112, 19931bc rqioaal 
UTIIllmiCQt.l, aU DCCUIII)' muaurea ~ aulboriud to cqllllit.alioa tqizu cnfor-tiac the 110olly UX1C iD IUppOrt .>f 111~ UN. On Ftbruuy 28, 
mfon:e the 110-lly J.OGC (Reo 816) 1994 NATO wupl.ulca abooC dowD four Scrbi.m aircraft iD violal.ioo oltbe 110-lly 
-· Manda&c of UNPROPOR mawlcd iD order to enable it to Sioce ill iacepllaa tbere have bcco fn:qucat violaliooa o( tbe ufc uu.~. Wbilc it bu 
deter allada q:llirut tbe declared ufe uu.1 of Srtbrcnica, 1101 becD 100" ~UCCC~~ful ill.uy o( lhc alx ufc areu It bu bcco applied to acru1er 
~o, Oow.dc:, Tulla, Dibac, llld Ztpa. UNPROPOR dqnx: ol clfcelivcoe.u ill Ztpa llld Srebrcnica Ibm tbc olbcr four UQI, In ~. 
ia ~. actina iD adl dcCcaee, to lake the DCCCUII)' Sarajevo, llld Bibac lhc ufc area cOIICqlt bu bcco a tolal failure u ~o bu bcco 
~DUAU~e~, iacludiac the UIC ol force, ill reply to cooaialcally aDKked while Clomde llld Bibac were ovemm by lhc Serba iD 
bcnbudmmla q:aiut the ufe uu.~ by aoy olthe parl.iCI Mard1/Aprill994111d Novembct/Deecmba' 1994, rapcctivcly. 
or the IU1IICid iacunioo iolo tbcm or ill tbe evc:al o( IDy 
ddibenle ob~ ill or uouad lholc: uu.~to tbe 
freedom o( 1110Ycmml o( UNPROPOR or o( the proccclcd 10-11 ApriU94-NATO wupl.ulca llrike BomiaD Serb poaitlooJ IICII' Oonzdc iD 
COIIVO)'I; SC dccjob dW mcmbcro-Jiolcl, actmc natiooally re-poo~C to ~ COIIIioucclacilc o( lhe Mual.im ufc havca by Serbi.m JIIIIIICftl. The 
o( lhroucb rqioaal cqanlz.al.iool of U'lliQ&miCIOia, may qc wu laDpOrVily balled but the Serbi.m oft'CIIIive cootimlal iD tbc followilll daya. 
~c. aU ooteewy IJIC.UIII'CI, lhrouah IIIC UIC ol air power, 
ill aDd arouod the ufc UQI ill lloclia, to support 5 Allpii/94-NA TO airc:ral\ a111Ck a Bomim Serb la!Jd IICII' Sarajevo ill mpcme to 
UNPROPOR in tbe perl'onn.mcc o( ill milldale (Rca 819, the Saba acimrc o( bQvy wupoa~ from a UN ~~Cntac aite. Immtdillcly after tbe air 
112.4 , 836) llriko, the Scrbt olfcrcd to rdllnl tbe heavy wcapou. 
23 Seplcmbcr/94-NA TO aircraft blut a Serbila tmk wut ol Sanjevo iD mpcme to 1 
Serb allack 011 a UN armoured vdliclc lhal wOUDdcd a Prc~~~:b pcacekt.qlcr. 
•Rcaolutioa 7S8 ulaldcd UNrROPOR'a maodlle to cmurc tbe aceurity IDd fiiiiCiioaiaa o( lhc S&njevo airport aDd lhc cldivay of~ 
uaislaacc IDd IUiborizcd tbe Scerdii)'-OeacniiO deploy, when be ,iudted it appropriale, ~ militaty cb~ero~cra llld rdalcd pcriOIIIId llld equipcpcnt 
roquimt foe lhcac dutica. Rcaolulioa 761 aulhoriud tbe Scerel.li)'-Oeacnlto deploy ID:ocdialcly addiliooal e1cmc:a1.a o( UNPROPOR to cmurc tbe 
aecurily llld fUDC\iooliai o( ~ airport llld tbe dclivay of~ uailllllec. 
SOURCU: Informalioo ill left aide o( lhe l.lblc lakeu from Uailed Na&iCllla ~ DPVlll21Rcv.2, March 1!5, 1994; .aoua& ol bualaaitariaa 
aid lakeu fna BDirrul Nrws, Ju.ly 5, 1994; pereca~~Cu 011 ~ aicllakca fna Plul Koriaf, "Pot whom~ aid flowa,• The Globe tllld 
NaJI, DeeaDber21, 1993, AI; violaliooaof-fl,y UJOO!akcn from UNOtnMidt!, volJCXXI,D0.3 (Scplaabcr 1994),28; illformalioo011 ufe arcu 
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